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FAIR USE IN ORACLE:
PROXIMATE CAUSE AT THE
COPYRIGHT/PATENT DIVIDE†
WENDY J. GORDON

ABSTRACT
In Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, the Federal Circuit undermined
copyright law’s deference to patent law and, in doing so, delivered a blow to
both regimes. Copyright’s deference to patent law—including a historic refusal
†
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to enforce rights that might undermine the public’s liberty to copy unpatented
inventions—is a necessary part of preserving inventors’ willingness to accept
the short duration, mandatory disclosure, and other stringent bargains patent
law demands. Deference to patent law is also integral to copyright law’s interior
architecture; copyright’s refusal to monopolize functional applications of
creative work lowers the social costs that would otherwise be imposed by
copyright’s ease of acquisition and long duration.
If patent law refuses to protect a functional device or other innovation
(perhaps because its patent has expired or because the innovation would be
obvious to anyone skilled in the field), various copyright doctrines make it
difficult for an eager claimant to use copyright law instead. These doctrines act
like fences.
For example, under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), copyright cannot extend to “ideas”
or to any “procedure, process, system, [or] method of operation.” This
prohibition applies “regardless” of the copyrighted “form” in which the idea,
procedure, process, or method appears. Therefore, the public violates no
copyright duties when it copies, say, ideas about how to improve the
manufacture of steel from a copyrighted instruction manual or video. If the
creator of the manufacturing idea wants protection for it, the inventor needs to
look to patent law.
Similarly, although copyright can subsist in drawings of a useful article, 17
U.S.C. § 113(b) and the case law disable those copyrights from giving any rights
to keep others from making or selling the article. Say the inventors of an
automobile engine with improved fuel efficiency want to restrain others from
building and selling copycat engines. To restrain such functional copying, the
inventors get no mileage out of the copyrights that subsist in their blueprints.
Rather, to stop competitors from building and selling the new engine, the
inventors must seek the protection of patent law.
Under yet another statutory rule, 17 U.S.C. § 101, sculptured shapes that
have “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information” are not copyrightable unless
their aesthetic and functional components are separable.
The instant Article discusses these and other limits on copyright law. Their
overall impact is to emphasize the importance Congress and the courts give to
preventing copyright law from directly or indirectly competing with patent law,
or undermining the choices Congress embedded in the patent statute.
Computer-program copyrights were intended to protect a programmer’s
expression, not their engineering ingenuity. As technology poses new
challenges, separate intellectual property laws need to keep congruent with the
separate purposes each serves. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Oracle, allowing the Court to evaluate a judicial opinion that this Article argues
ignored these first principles.
A need for congruence (or “fit”) is recognized in most areas of civil liability.
For example, in enforcing the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court honored the need
for congruence by creating a doctrine it called “antitrust injury” to limit
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liability. The common law of torts generally employs the doctrine called
“proximate cause” to similarly assure fit between the facts of a given case and
the law’s purposes. In copyright law, the courts and Congress entrust this
familiar but crucial task to “fair use.” The instant Article employs analogies
from antitrust and the common law of torts to reinforce the appropriateness of
using the fair use doctrine to keep copyright law in its own yard.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article explains why, in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC,1 the owner
of copyright in Java should lose in its attempt to control the ease with which
third-party programmers can use a Java-like interface to develop programs for
Google’s Android platform. Put simply, Oracle has framed its attempt as a suit
in copyright, and copyright is an inappropriate vehicle for protecting functional
aspects of Oracle’s computer code. Copyright’s rules were created to deal with
a wholly different set of issues, and their details produce social benefit and have
normative appeal only when applied to the domain for which they are suited.
Intellectual property regimes are not interchangeable. Rules that suit
rhinoceroses might well prove uncomfortable if applied to gazelles. Copyright
governs “works of authorship” that are “original” and “fixed in any tangible
medium.”2 By contrast, the law of utility patent covers any “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.”3 Although a judge may look at a set of facts and think that “the
propriety of some remedy appears to be clear,”4 such a perception would not
1
886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. granted, No. 18-956, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov.
15, 2019) (mem.).
2
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). Works that are written down, filmed, taped, or otherwise
embodied in a physical copy or “phonorecord” are “fixed.” Id. § 101. Fixed works are
governed (with few exceptions) by federal law. Id. § 301 (providing for federal preemption).
State law can protect “unfixed” works, like a human cannonball’s circus performance that
has not been filmed or otherwise recorded under the performer’s authorization. Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-79 (1977) (applying Ohio law). Sometimes
the label for protecting unfixed performance and other unfixed works is “common law
copyright,” and sometimes (as in the human cannonball case) the label used is “right of
publicity.” Compare id. at 576, with Megan Carpenter & Steven Hetcher, Function over
Form: Bringing the Fixation Requirement into the Modern Era, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221,
2239, 2250 (2014) (describing as “common law copyright”).
3
35 U.S.C. § 101. The patent requirement of newness is judged by a high standard: to be
patentable, the innovation must be nonobvious to an ordinary person skilled in the art. Id.
§ 103. Copyright’s “originality” standard is far easier to meet. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means
only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”).
4
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). The quoted phrase appears in Justice Brandeis’s classic discussion of
comparative institutional competence and its importance for issues in intellectual property.
The discussion appears in International News Service v. Associated Press, a still-controversial
case that concerned the copying of war news during the first World War. Id. at 229-33.
In that famous (some say “infamous”) case, a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the
grant of an injunction ordering one news service to stop transmitting and using news of the
day (facts) that it obtained from a competitor’s newspapers and public bulletin boards. Id. at
245-46 (majority opinion). The injunction against copying any particular fact lasted “until its
commercial value as news to the complainant and all of its members ha[d] passed away.” Id.
at 245 (emphasis omitted).
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justify recourse to any particular legal scheme. The copyright scheme has an
ease of acquisition and a length of term that are inconsistent with the standards
and duration Congress has chosen in patent law to govern technological
innovations. It can be tempting for a court to use whatever tool is at hand to “do
justice,” but the use of inappropriate tools is more likely to be disastrous than
just.5
It is desirable to avoid mismatch of circumstance and legal regime here, just
as it is desirable to avoid other instances where giving a plaintiff relief would
not serve the goals of the law that had created the very cause of action by which
the plaintiff sues. To these ends, a variety of legal devices have evolved. In
negligence law, “proximate cause” is a primary doctrine that refuses to impose
liability when liability would not further the law’s goals. In copyright law, “fair
use” is the primary doctrine that performs the task of ensuring that liability will
serve copyright’s goals.
The majority opinion ignored the free speech issues, including the possibility that the
plaintiff news service might refuse to sell or license news to the defendant’s newspapers. See
id. at 266 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nor did the majority’s opinion take account of the fact
that the defendant news service was barred from much of the European theater of war and
might have had no source for war news other than from the plaintiff’s papers and bulletin
board. It was only Justice Brandeis, the lone jurist who was willing to face issues of
institutional constraint, who found the voice to tackle these issues directly.
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis discussed many possibilities that a legislature but not a court
might adopt. For example,
[i]f a legislature concluded . . . that under certain circumstances news-gathering is a
business affected with a public interest, it might declare that, in such cases, news should
be protected against appropriation, only if the gatherer assumed the obligation of
supplying it, at reasonable rates and without discrimination, to all papers which applied
therefor. . . .
Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede a
determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property right in
news . . . . Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations essential to
full enjoyment of the rights conferred . . . . Considerations such as these should lead us
to decline to establish a new rule of law in the effort to redress a newly-disclosed wrong,
although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear.
Id. (emphasis added). For institutional reasons, then, Justice Brandeis would have given
victory to the defendant.
5
I have long learned from Pamela Samuelson’s insights in this regard. See, e.g., Pamela
Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1497 (2017) [hereinafter Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning
Boundaries]; Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction
Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 180-81 (Jane
C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) [hereinafter Samuelson, The Story of
Baker v. Selden].In Strategies for Discerning Boundaries, Professor Samuelson examines
several strategies that the law employs or could employ to deal with potential copyright/patent
overlap. Using her classification scheme, the position I take in the instant Article would be
classified as a “layering or segmentation” approach. See Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning
Boundaries, supra, at 1495-96, 1517-21.
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Fair use and proximate cause are not identical, but they show remarkable
similarities. Their parallels are not surprising, since both copyright law and
negligence law govern spheres in which everyday activities—most of them
legitimate—occasionally conflict. Judges employ fair use and proximate cause
to avoid chilling behaviors that happen to stumble over a legal tripwire merely
by coincidence.
If one compared the breadth of the two doctrines, there is no reason for fair
use to be narrower than proximate cause. If anything, fair use should be the
broader and more easily available doctrine because copyright liability can be
imposed for harmless use.6 By contrast, in negligence law, findings of
“insufficiently proximate cause” shelter careless defendants who factually
contributed (in a “but-for” sense)7 to someone’s injury.
Proximate cause doctrine has advantages as a source of learning for copyright
partly because negligence law emerged from a longer and more gradual period
of judicial development than did copyright. Thus, proximate cause case law
recognizes a number of typical scenarios in which proximate cause can be
lacking. By contrast, though many of these scenarios have parallels in copyright
law, the jurisprudence of fair use is only beginning to crystallize them. 8
The instant Article uses as an analogy the subclass of proximate cause cases
that make explicit the doctrine’s function of safeguarding the normative nexus
between the law’s actual concerns and the facts of a particular case. Commonly,
such cases involve “fortuity” or “coincidence.” In these cases, a lawyer might
say that the fortuity “breaks the causal chain.” The “breaking” metaphor simply
means that courts tend to relieve negligent actors of liability when there is no
logical connection—only a coincidental one—between the facts on the ground
and the kind of behavior and effects toward which the law was addressed.
In fortuitous cases, imposing liability would satisfy neither a law’s
instrumentalist goals (such as furthering economic welfare) nor a law’s demands
for normative structure (through concepts such as corrective justice). 9 Fair use
6
In cases where no harm is caused, I have argued, liability should be much less available
than current case law would permit. See Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in
Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 452, 454 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
7
The standard test for factual causation in tort law uses a counterfactual inquiry: how
would the plaintiff have fared ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligence?
8
Classification of fair use subtypes has begun to develop in the literature. See, e.g., Pamela
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541-42 (2009); see also
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1627-35 (1982) [hereinafter
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure]. General norms can and should exist alongside the
identification of subtypes. The most used general norm is probably Judge Leval’s popular
criterion, “transformativity.” See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
9
For a corrective justice model, I refer primarily to ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE
JUSTICE (2012). As for the notion of civil redress, it is a concept that resembles corrective

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553408

396

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:389

similarly tends to avoid imposing liability in circumstances that would advance
neither the economic goals nor the philosophic goals of copyright law.
In Oracle, the Supreme Court must decide, implicitly or explicitly, whether
courts are permitted to impose copyright liability in situations where the reasons
for copying had nothing to do with the copyright’s raison d’être and where
imposing liability would undercut patent law. Most precedent and logic, this
Article argues, indicate that courts are not permitted to disregard statutory and
decisional norms in this way.
Part I of this Article introduces three judicially created modes of limiting
liability. They are “fair use,” which operates to keep wayward results in
particular cases from undermining copyright’s goals and wasting social
resources; “antitrust injury,” which bars recovery when plaintiffs’ injuries arise
in a manner not within the antitrust statutes’ sphere of concern; and “proximate
cause,” a familiar if difficult component of common law torts. Part II gives more
detail about the fair use doctrine, and argues that avoiding interference with the
operation and attractiveness of the patent system is a goal “interior” both to
federal copyright law and to its fair use doctrine. Part III explains the importance
of maintaining the statutory and judge-made fences that copyright law employs
to give a wide berth to patent law. Part III also addresses how copyright’s
deference to patent law is threatened by the Court of Appeals decision in Oracle.
Part IV expands the Oracle discussion. It also draws on “antitrust injury” and
“proximate cause” to emphasize the impropriety of mechanically applying laws
that regulate conflicts among valuable activities. Part IV also ties together the
strands of negligence law, antitrust law, and copyright law to explain why
copying motivated solely by a desire for technological advantage should be fair
use, not infringement. Part V interrogates the analogy from proximate cause and
concludes that the analogy truly assists in deciding whether a merely
technological use of a copyrighted work is incapable of violating copyright law.
A Conclusion follows, urging the Supreme Court to find that it is “fair use” to
copy for the technological purpose of furthering interoperability.
I.

ANALOGIES FROM STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW

To start the journey, my first offering is a pop quiz.
Consider this statement: “Courts should refrain from imposing liability when
finding the defendant liable would fail to further the very purposes of the law
being enforced.” If that language came from a judicial opinion, what doctrine
would the opinion be addressing:
a) the “antitrust injury” doctrine under the Clayton Act,
b) the “proximate cause” doctrine of negligence law, or
c) the “fair use” doctrine of copyright law?

justice in being noninstrumentalist but that has a contour of its own. For a prominent civil
redress approach, see JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS
122-24 (2020).
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It’s a trick question, of course. The statement could come from an opinion
addressing any of the three doctrines. Each doctrine directs courts to refuse to
impose liability where enforcement would have no effect that furthers the law’s
goals. (As it happens, the statement originates in one of the Supreme Court’s
most important opinions on the fair use doctrine.10)
Courts employ the requirement that there be a normative connection in many
contexts. This Article examines situations where the interaction between
plaintiff and defendant bears a surface similarity to a relation proscribed by law,
but the facts present no normative connection to the law at issue. In such cases,
as illustrated by the pop quiz, refraining from liability is not only proper but also
has often “been thought necessary to fulfill” the “very purpose” of the law being
enforced.11
In particular, this Article examines Oracle, a case in which the defendant has
copied some of the plaintiff’s computer program for reasons related not to its
expressive value but to the functional, utilitarian advantages the copying could
bestow. In Oracle and cases like it, to impose liability for such copying would
not only fail to fulfill copyright’s affirmative goals but would also violate patent
policy and the many copyright doctrines that explicitly nullify the public’s duties
not to copy when imposing such a duty would tread on patent law’s toes.
Judges employ a variety of doctrinal categories to avoid enforcing legal duties
in circumstances that have null or negative fit. One of the key principles
animating these various doctrines is parsimony: “[T]he prevailing view is that
[the law’s] cumbrous and expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion
unless some clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo.”12
Requiring “fit” also has virtues independent of instrumental concerns like
parsimony. As Professor Ernest Weinrib emphasizes, a need for normative fit
emerges from the societal choice to resolve a dispute by putting it into private
hands.13 When government chooses to resolve a matter through private law,
rather than through administrative action or blunt tools such as subsidies and
taxes, that choice is important. The choice having been made, the relation
between plaintiff and defendant (the relationship that stands at the center of
litigation) must be meaningful. From that relationship Professor Weinrib
extracts the origin and explanation for proximate cause. It is the proximate cause
and duty doctrines to which Professor Weinrib points to illustrate his claim that
corrective justice itself requires that liability in private law must express the

10
“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 575 (1994) (alteration and omission in original) (emphases added) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
11
See id.
12
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881). He was speaking of the choice
between negligence law and strict liability; proximate cause raises related issues.
13
WEINRIB, supra note 9, at 9-11.
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“normative connection” between doer and sufferer.14 The gain or loss is
actionable only if it is the kind of gain or loss at which the law aimed itself. 15
There must be normative coherence or “fit” between what makes a defendant
liable to the plaintiff on the one hand and the logic of the governing law on the
other hand.16 The fact that someone is a wrongdoer does not dictate that they
should be required to pay for all the damages that might coincidentally flow from
their action.17 Courts often if not invariably make defendants pay only for those
impacts that relate to the goals of the law being applied.18
Fit need not be perfect. In some legal domains, less emphasis is placed on
whether each case furthers the law’s goals than on whether the system as a whole
has acceptable fit. But copyright’s fair use doctrine takes a more individualized
approach. This makes sense. Much copying behavior constitutes the vehicle for
socially useful education and adaptation; because works of authorship can be
infinitely multiplied, copying is often harmless, and restraints on copying can
impinge on free speech. In addition, analogies from negligence law and antitrust
law suggest that the benefits of ensuring “fit” are worth the candle.
The issue of “fit” is no less pressing when more than one legal regime is
involved. All forms of IP have reasons both to grant private parties exclusive
rights and to grant the public liberties of use. The boundaries between duty and
liberty, owned and public domain, vary according to subject matter. To identify
federal IP policy, the major federal IP statutes must be considered as a linked
group.
When considerations of statutory purpose are drawn from both patent law and
copyright law, this Article shows that, together, they dictate that copyright law
should not impose liability for copying that enables software interoperability.

14

See id. at 14-15; Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485,
520 (1989) (“The concepts of proximate cause and duty normatively link the wrongfulness of
the defendant’s unreasonable risk-creation with the wrongfulness of the plaintiff’s
suffering.”). Corrective-justice theory focuses on the bipolarity of the plaintiff-defendant
causative link, as opposed to, say, an economic analysis that might divorce “who pays” from
“who causes.” See Weinrib, supra, at 494-526.
15
Weinrib, supra note 14, at 494-526.
16
WEINRIB, supra note 9, at 90.
17
Professors John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky have developed a “civil redress” theory that
bears a “cousin-ship” to the corrective justice approach of Professor Weinrib. A new book
explores it but came out too recently to be integrated here. See generally GOLDBERG &
ZIPURSKY, supra note 9. In an earlier work, Professor Goldberg said that what matters is
whether the defendant “mistreated” the plaintiff. John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and
Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1315, 1337-38 (2003). This too tracks aspects of
proximate cause: the more coincidental the injury, the less likely is the plaintiff to “justifiably
maintain a sense of victimization or indignation with respect to her treatment at the hands of
the defendant.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (giving examples of recovery barred “because the
injury came about too fortuitously”).
18
See WEINRIB, supra note 9, at 94-98.
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Such enforcement would at best fail to serve Congress’s purposes in copyright
law and at worst frustrate Congress’s purposes in both copyright and patent law.
A.

Proximate Cause

One way to understand the commonality among proximate cause, antitrust
injury, and fair use is to show the significant role played in each of the three
doctrines by coincidence and fortuity.19 Hopefully these analogies will put us in
a better position to understand what went wrong with the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Oracle.20
B.

Examples to Raise Preliminary Questions

The following examples come from the law of antitrust, the common law of
negligence, and the laws of copyright and patent.
Example 1. Antitrust. The Clayton Act proscribes mergers “whose effect ‘may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.’” 21 If an
unlawful merger causes some small firms to lose money, one might expect that
the small firms could recover damages. In a leading case, Brunswick v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,22 the plaintiffs were small bowling alleys who argued that the
defendant, a giant-sized merged firm, had taken actions that hurt the small
businesses.23 How did the plaintiffs claim the big firm hurt them? The big firm
had acquired bowling centers that competed with the plaintiffs. By keeping these

19
The words are close synonyms. Coincidence tends to be the word preferred by torts
scholars; fortuity is the word the Supreme Court employed in the antitrust context. The two
should be distinguished from “moral luck,” a term sometimes used to designate occasions
“when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment, despite the fact that
a significant aspect of what he is assessed for depends on factors beyond his control.” Dana
K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luck/
[https://perma.cc/DZW4-EBHE] (last modified Apr. 19, 2019).
My approach to fair use has many cousins. For example, I tread territory similar to what
Professor Samuelson calls the type of fair use that arises when the facts of a particular case
are “orthogonal” to the purposes of copyright law. Samuelson, supra note 8, at 2593-97, 2619.
I am indebted to her writings on computer copyright generally (though I cannot pretend to
have read them all) and to her understanding of key historic moments and developments
(particularly with regard to Baker). I am also indebted to the insights of Abraham
Drassinower. See generally ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING?
(2015).
20
Baker is, of course, a leading case from which sprung a number of doctrines that today
help keep copyright from entering patent territory. See Samuelson, The Story of Baker v.
Selden, supra note 5, at 180-81.
21
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (emphases
omitted) (quoting Clayton Act, ch. 232, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018))).
22
429 U.S. 477 (1977).
23
Id. at 479.
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other small bowling centers open in significant number, the merged firm had
prevented the plaintiffs from raising prices.24
Plaintiffs had proven an unlawful merger and that their income would have
been higher had the unlawful merger not taken place. Should they prevail?
Example 2. Negligence. Assume that a roofer carelessly drops rubble on the
street. The obstruction delays an auto, whose driver later experiences injuries
that otherwise would have been avoided. Say, for example, that the delay makes
the car arrive at a particular corner at the moment lightning strikes, or at the
moment when another driver speeds through a stop sign.
Should liability follow for the roofer? The roofer was negligent and was a
“but-for” cause of the harm, yet the kind of accident that occurred would be
reduced in neither frequency nor intensity if roofers took more care.
Example 3. Copyright is involved but patent law is not. Assume that a
composer’s third symphony happens to create attractive patterns on the page
when printed in sheet music form. Assume further that a wallpaper firm notices
the visual beauty of the notes on the page, copies the sheet music without
permission, and turns it into popular wall coverings.
Copyright law gives composers (or their employers or assignees) rights over
the reproduction of sheet music. It’s possible (though debatable) that
compositional excellence can be metered, and compositional energy induced, by
royalty fees flowing from sheet music, downloads, or performance streams. 25
However, it is undebatable that compositional skill in music cannot be metered
by the popularity of wallpaper.26
Should the owner of the musical-composition copyright have a good cause of
action against the wallpaper firm?
Example 4. Copyright and patent law are both involved. An artist sketches an
abstract shape that is quite lovely and sculpts it into alabaster. Now assume that
a large aviation company sees the sketch or sculpture on sale and somehow
realizes that the shape, if duplicated in certain metals, would perform as an
especially effective helicopter rotor.27

24

Id. at 482-83.
See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 90-92 (2015).
26
The music-wallpaper example is one where imposing liability will have null positive
effects. It fits within what Professor Samuelson calls the “orthogonal” category of fair use,
which is quite similar to the proximate cause function this Article presents. See Samuelson,
supra note 8, at 2593-97, 2619; supra note 19. Professor Samuelson illustrates her orthogonal
category by pointing to the fair use treatment usually given to court personnel and trial lawyers
who reproduce letters and memoranda for use as evidence in court proceedings. Id. at 259394. The documents are undoubtedly copyrighted literary works, but copying for litigation
purposes is fair use because it is being “done for a purpose orthogonal to the purpose for
which the work was originally created.” Id. at 2619.
27
The sculpture I have in mind is Constantin Brancusi, Bird in Space (1923),
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/486757 [https://perma.cc/4REN-EWJ6].
25
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The company reproduces the lovely shape in the form of helicopter rotors,
without permission from the copyright owner. Assume further that, under one of
patent law’s many rules, the sculptor has let too much time pass to apply for a
utility patent. Should the aviation company’s functional use of the artworks
count as infringement of copyright?
II.

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF FAIR USE

Fair use can arise from a lack of fit between the facts of a particular case and
copyright’s own norms. One might say that such types of fair use are motivated
by “interior” concerns.28 Fair use can also arise when enforcing a particular kind
of copyright claim would conflict with norms “exterior” to copyright itself.
To illustrate, here is a fact pattern that mixes interior and exterior concerns:
Consider a love letter. Like most written communications, it will probably have
a copyright. If a hostile party copied the letter to submit it as evidence in a
divorce trial, the copying would likely constitute fair use. Part of the reason for
fair use would be that permitting nonconsensual copying in this setting will
facilitate truth finding in litigation. The latter is a valuable goal but one
“exterior” to copyright. Another part of the reason would be that court-related
copying is hardly a reliable barometer of a writer’s skill or popularity. 29 This
lack of connection to authorial incentives is an “interior” reason for the fair-use
grant because it rests on copyright’s own norms.
Of the many kinds of fair use relevant to Oracle,30 this Article primarily
addresses two. Both rely on interior norms. The first type of fair use that
28

My “market failure” approach to fair use is primarily interior in this way. In my earlier
work, Fair Use as Market Failure, I argue that because (1) the central mechanism of copyright
law is to incentivize authors by giving them leverage with which to extract payments from
markets, (2) fair use is likely appropriate in cases where, even if the copyright were enforced,
circumstances would interfere with the market’s ability to serve the public interest. See
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 8, at 1602-04.
29
Professor Samuelson uses a similar example to illustrate what she calls the “orthogonal”
category of fair use. See Samuelson, supra note 8, at 2593-97, 2619. She explains that copying
for litigation purposes is fair use because it is being “done for a purpose orthogonal to” (at
right angles to) “the purpose for which the work was originally created.” Id. at 2619. Compare
this to the proximate cause function of fair use described in this Article. The proximate cause
type of inquiry might compare the copier’s purposes not to the author’s purposes, but only as
part of evaluating how imposing liability on the copier would impact on the statute’s goals.
30
For example, copyright owners who invite copying should be estopped from removing
their permission if the net effect of the course of behavior is to harm copyists who have relied
on the prior permissions. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression]. It is
arguable that Sun, Oracle’s predecessor in interest, created such reliance by invitations to
copy and that the behavior should be attributed to Oracle in a way that, through fair use,
expands the public’s liberties. The estoppel argument is highly fact dependent, as is the issue
of whether copying by Google should be entitled to the expansion of liberty. See id. at 1567.
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concerns this Article arises when the fair use doctrine serves as a test for
normative fit between copyright’s goals and the facts of a given case. This is the
most general way to describe fair use: it resembles proximate cause because it
reflects judicial insistence on a normative, nonarbitrary connection between the
defendant’s deeds and the law’s purposes.31
The second type of fair use this Article addresses is a subset of the first.
Sometimes referred to as the “explanation/use distinction,” it embeds a
dichotomy between two kinds of copying: copying for purposes properly within
copyright’s domain (such as copying for purposes of explanation, entertainment,
or education) and copying for solely functional purposes (such as copying a
copyrighted sketch of an invention for the purpose of building the invention).32
Copying for purely functional use should always be fair, because there is only
an arbitrary connection between a work’s suitability for functional uses and
copyright’s desire to provide authorial incentives.33

31

See Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1992, at 93, 94-95; id. at 101 (“In a civilized nation, much of reality is artifact.
Too broad a set of intellectual property rights can give one set of persons control over how
that reality is viewed, perceived, interpreted—control over what the world
means. . . . [L]imitations on copyright are appropriate to provide the public a liberty of
reconceptualization.”).
32
Enunciated most clearly in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-06 (1880), the
explanation/use distinction was endorsed for pictorial works by the Copyright Act of 1976.
See 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2018); infra Section V.B.2 (discussing origins of Copyright Act). Its
logic would extend to literary and audio works as well, via the fair use doctrine. Fair use too
is a judicial development now memorialized in statutory form. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
33
To briefly summarize what the Article later argues, fair use for functional applications
is appropriate for the following reasons: First, the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 102-06 (1880) can be interpreted as holding that copyright owners have no exclusive rights
to control utilitarian uses of their copyrighted works. Second, the post-Baker cases implicitly
referenced in 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) seem to take that view of Baker. Although the title of § 113
mentions pictorial and sculptural design, the provision’s language is broad enough to
encompass other kinds of copyrighted works, including computer programs. See Wendy J.
Gordon, How Oracle Erred: The Concept of “Use” and the Future of Computer Copyright,
in COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 375, 380-86 (Ruth L. Okediji ed.,
2017) [hereinafter Gordon, How Oracle Erred]. Third, imposing copyright liability for
functional use could weaken inventors’ willingness to accept patent law’s comparatively
harsh terms. And fourth, any injury caused by functional use will impact incentives and
interests that copyright does not protect.
My concept of “interests that copyright does not protect” warrants explanation. Any
income, admittedly, can impact authorial incentives. Some gains and losses are more closely
connected to copyright’s goals than are others. The kind of harm most significant in the fair
use inquiry occurs when a copyright owner loses income because a copyist makes and sells
unauthorized reproductions that satisfy the public’s taste for the plaintiff’s authorship. Such
harm is particularly important because substituting a copy for the original threatens a key goal
of copyright—namely, to incentivize authors to satisfy the public’s demand for authorship.
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It might be wondered why this Article classifies as “interior” a kind of fair
use that refers both to copyright and to patent for governing norms. That question
is addressed in the next Section.
III. CONGRESS GIVES THE CROWN TO PATENT LAW, A JEALOUS MONARCH
In the federal scheme of intellectual property, Congress has clearly made
patent sovereign. In delving into patents law’s objectives, copyright law’s goals
also become clear. The yearning to protect artistry must, by congressional
command, yield to patent law when the two conflict. Similarly, the yearning of
trademark judges to protect consumers from consumer confusion also yields to
patent law when the two conflict. Consider how Congress has ordered the
statutes so that preserving patent law’s freedom of action dominates both federal
trademark and federal copyright law.
Federal trademark law under the Lanham Act seeks to prevent consumers
from being confused about the source or sponsorship of goods and services. 34
Yet the Lanham Act refuses to protect distinctive designs as marks if they are
“functional.” Regardless of how many consumers have come to associate the
functional design with a particular company, anyone can copy it. Any relief
obtained would be modest. For example, a defendant copyist might be ordered
to add labels to clarify which company made a particular object. 35

The Supreme Court has distinguished substitutionary harm from losses that result from the
public losing taste for the plaintiff’s authorship. The latter losses do not weigh against granting
fair use, even if the change in taste resulted from copying. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994) (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review,
kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright
Act.”) Like taste-changing uses, functional uses of copyrighted works (such as building a
machine from a copyrighted blueprint) reflect factors other than the public’s taste for the
plaintiff’s authorship. If copying threatens the market for these nonauthorial uses, the losses
should not be cognizable under the market impact factor of the fair use inquiry. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(4). Although I know of no decisions that have yet applied the logic of Acuff-Rose to
functional uses, the logic of extending Acuff-Rose to these other situations is strong.
34
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2001).
35
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964). Sears has been subject
to varying treatment over the years. Its relevance to the Oracle dispute might be questioned
also because Sears is a preemption case addressing federal/state conflict rather than
addressing, as Oracle must, comity among federal statutes. Id. at 227-28 (noting that question
is whether “State’s law of unfair competition is compatible with the federal patent law”).
Nevertheless, this core holding remains good law and has been absorbed into the federal
Lanham Act both judicially and by statute. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (providing that
functional marks are not registrable); id. § 1125(a)(3) (“In a civil action for trade dress
infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the
person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to
be protected is not functional.”).
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The reason why the distinctive functional design itself can be copied and sold
by anyone is straightforward: deference to patent law.36 Deciding the appropriate
balance between protection and free use for functional articles is a decision
Congress embodied in the patent statutes. Trademark law must take patent policy
into account.37
Because a trademark owner’s rights are largely limited to preventing
confusion,38 they are narrower than the exclusive rights given to copyright
owners. Therefore, copyright poses a greater threat to patent and shows an even
stronger deference to patent law than does trademark law. Consider some of the
many ways that copyright expresses its deference to patent:


The copyright statute explicitly refuses to give copyright protection
to any “procedure, process, system, [or] method of operation”;39
those are governed by patent law.40 They go unprotected even if they
are “described, explained, illustrated, or embodied” in a work of
creative authorship.41



Under both statute and Supreme Court precedent, not all copyrights
are equal. Copyrights in the depiction of “useful articles” (such as
photos of chairs, cardboard models of machines, and drawings of
lamps) are weak; they have no force against persons who copy them
to make working versions of the actual articles.42 Thus, while an artist
can copyright a drawing of a highway interchange, the drawing gives

36
“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating
a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.” TrafFix,
532 U.S. at 34.
37
Judicial decisions like TrafFix rest on statutory supports. Under the Lanham Act,
functionality invalidates any trademark, even an “incontestable” registered trademark. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1064(3), 1065. Similarly, persons who file federal litigation on the basis of an
unregistered mark have the burden of proving nonfunctionality. Id. § 1125.
38
I do not mean to understate the danger that trademark doctrine could also pose to patent
law were “functional” marks not removed from trademark law’s palette. Not only are some
trademarks and service marks protected from dilution as well as from confusion, but in
addition the meaning of “confusion” has drastically expanded over the last half-century. See,
e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990). Further, suits sometimes succeed
against uses of marks in roles and contexts outside trademark law’s traditional scope. See,
e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670-74 (2007).
39
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
40
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent . . . .”).
41
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
42
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-06 (1880) (explaining why it would be a “fraud
upon the public” to empower copyright owners to restrict the public from deploying
techniques and systems depicted in copyright works).
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the copyright owner no power to object or collect royalties when a
transportation agency embeds the artist’s drawn design choices in a
real highway off-ramp.43


Similarly, a sculptured form that is also a useful article cannot gain
copyright except to the extent that its utilitarian and aesthetic features
are “separable.”44

In all these cases, copyright is restrained so that patent law’s decisions can
govern. And often the patent decision is to allow the public to copy.
Deference to patent is so strong a theme in copyright law that, in Example 4
above—the helicopter-rotor example—a victory for the defendant would be
overdetermined by many of the doctrines just mentioned.45


The court might hold that the sculpture lacks copyright on the ground
that copyright law declares that “useful articles” with inseparable
functional elements are uncopyrightable.46

43

Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding that
building bridge that duplicates design of drawing does not infringe copyright in drawing).
Early cases such as Muller are still good law. They are incorporated by reference in 17 U.S.C.
§ 113(b); see also infra Section V.B.2 (outlining history of Copyright Act of 1976).
44
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “useful article”). The definitional case law on both “useful
article” and “separability” is in disarray following Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017) (holding that article is protected under copyright only if it
“(1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful
article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work . . . if it
were imagined separately from the useful article”).
45
The defendant’s victory could be stated either in terms of the copyright not extending to
this useful object (noncopyrightability) or in terms of the rights of the copyright owner not
being violated (“scope of right”). The Supreme Court opinion in Baker seems to embrace both
perspectives. Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-06; see infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text
(detailing each perspective).
The statute also provides the same two grounds for a defendant victory. First, the
noncopyrightability ground appears in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), which excludes from copyright
protection any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery.” This is further supported by the “separability” limitation that appears in § 101 as
part of the definition of “useful article.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “useful article” as
“having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely . . . the appearance of the article or
to convey information”). Second, the ground based in scope of right appears in § 107 (defining
fair use) and § 113 (defining rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works).
46
17 U.S.C. § 113(b).
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Or the court might find that the defendant’s helicopter company was
not violating copyright law because a copyright owner’s “exclusive
rights” never extend to functional “use.”47



Alternatively, the court might say that the shape “merged” into an
uncopyrightable idea.48



Or perhaps the court would state the ground for defendant’s victory
in terms of “fair use.”49

Congress grudgingly rations protection under its patent law.50 This is
evidenced by patent law’s restraints: an inventor cannot get a patent without
applying for it,51 and the patent must meet standards of “nonobviousness”52 and
“novelty.”53 Further, what’s given when these demands are met is a short period
of exclusive right: the patented innovation goes into the public domain after a
term of twenty years,54 far shorter than the copyright term of “life of the author”
plus seventy years.55 The statutory pattern suggests that Congress sees
significant costs in granting exclusive rights over inventions. The courts
certainly seem to think so.
The high cost of “locking up” inventions may be one reason why Congress in
the copyright and trademark statutes and courts in preemption cases tend to see
copyright and trademark law as obligated to withhold their own exclusive rights
when such rights might undermine patent law’s dominance. Patent needs the
ability to make its decisions binding. For example, here is the Supreme Court:
In regard to mechanical configurations, Congress had balanced the need
to encourage innovation and originality of invention against the need to
insure competition in the sale of identical or substantially identical
products. The standards established for granting federal patent protection
to machines thus indicated not only which articles in this particular
category Congress wished to protect, but which configurations it wished to
remain free.56

47
Id.; Baker, 101 U.S. at 105 (distinguishing “explanation” from “use”). The animating
principle here is a distinction between uses properly regulated by copyright law and uses not
regulable by copyright because they belong in the domain of patent law.
48
See, e.g., Allen v. Acad. Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617-18 (1996).
49
17 U.S.C. § 107.
50
I refer to utility patents (rather than to design patents, for example) unless otherwise
specified.
51
See 35 U.S.C §§ 111, 151.
52
Id. § 103.
53
Id. § 102.
54
Id. § 154(a)(2).
55
17 U.S.C. § 302. The rules of copyright duration are quite complex, but most works
created after 1978 will have life-plus-seventy protection.
56
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569 (1973).
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Copyright, by contrast, seems to reflect the judgment that it costs society very
little. Consider the statutory pattern: copyrights arise automatically, 57 the
applicable standard for protection is absurdly easy to meet, 58 and today the
typical copyright will likely last a century or more.59 Arguably these easy, longlived rights can be tolerated because, as we are told, they cannot “lock up” an
idea or procedure.60 However, what happens when copyright is used to “lock
up” an idea or method of operation? That is the danger with copyrights in
software.
That brings us to another example. This one is more controversial, for it lies
at the center of Oracle. The maker of a program copies symbols such as words
and numbers that, standing alone, might resemble part of a literary work. The
copying might look like a copyright violation. However, on inspection it is
learned that the value of the sequences has nothing to do with expressive merit.
Whether the sequences were elegant and well-articulated or drab and clumsy
was irrelevant. They were “method headers”—language from Java needed to
carry out commands—copied for purposes of furthering interoperability. 61 The
act of copying when it has nothing to do with expressive values should not be
copyright infringement. Moreover, penalizing the copying can even be
counterproductive, for it enables copyright to invade the territory that Congress
has given to patent law.
A.

Guarding Against Fortuitous Connections

Courts enforce legal rights according to the purposes those rights are meant
to serve.62 When by fortuity something outside of the purposes of the law falls
unexpectedly within its reach, the coincidence must be seen for what it is: an
outlier. In a major case currently before the Supreme Court—Oracle—hewing
to this basic principle can keep the Court from repeating the lower court’s errors.
Both by statute and decisional law, copyright owners cannot use the courts to
control copying that, by intention and effect, has nothing to do with authorial
expression.63 As will be shown below, that limitation is particularly sharp when
the copier wants to employ the author’s work functionally because copyright’s
57

17 U.S.C. § 101(a).
Id. (providing protection for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
59
Id. § 302.
60
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
61
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, No. 18-956, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2019) (mem.).
62
Jurisprudence scholar Ernest Weinrib goes so far as to claim that such limits must inhere
in any plaintiff/defendant private law relation that complies with corrective justice. See
generally WEINRIB, supra note 9.
63
17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 113(b); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-06 (1880); see also
Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note 33, at 380-86 (collecting cases).
58
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availability in such contexts might undermine innovators’ willingness to accept
the demands and limitations of patent law.
To illustrate why copyright should not be giving exclusive rights in functional
objects, consider this metaphor from Benjamin Kaplan: “[T]o make the
copyright turnstile revolve, the author should have to deposit more than a penny
in the box . . . .”64 If what the Copyright Act requires to make its turnstile revolve
is a metaphorical nickel, then what patent legislation requires to make its
turnstile revolve is a metaphorical twenty-dollar bill. Holdings such as the
Federal Circuit’s holding in Oracle would give plaintiffs quasi-patent rights in
return for small change.
B.

Why Does the Oracle Case Raise the Issue of Interoperability?

An understanding of the role of interoperability in the Oracle case is crucial
to reaching a conclusion on fair use. However, the role of interoperability in the
case might not be clear, since there seems to be no dispute that Android can
“interoperate” with certain elements of Java in the same way any other user
can.65 The particular problem is less a matter of Android/Java linkages than of
linkages between Android and third-party applications (“apps”).66
By the time Google came on the scene with its Android smartphone, a
multitude of third-party programs already utilized Java “method headers.”67 Java
had encouraged such use.68 Google and the third-party programmers wanted
preexisting and new programs to be easily usable on Android, with minimum
alteration to preexisting programs and minimum duplication when a new app
was prepared for distribution.69
This may sound like a selfish desire. However, it is a selfish desire that
redounds to the benefit of the public. If a command to “take the square root of a
number” is identified and its syntax structured by a particular method header
convention in Java, that particular method header specifies the text that thirdparty programmers are accustomed to employing to signal that they want to take
a square root.

64

BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 46 (1967).
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1368-72 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting
structure of Google’s interoperability argument).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1348-51, 1360.
68
Java’s slogan had been “write once, run anywhere.” D ON RAUF, GETTING TO KNOW JAVA
7 (2019) (“Java’s catchphrase was ‘write once, run anywhere.’ Code written on one computer
in this new lingo could run on another system. Gosling and colleagues concocted a system
that eliminated some of the tedious aspects of writing code. Java allowed the user to write bits
of code that could be reused later without needing to rewrite the code over and over again. As
internet use became widespread in the 1990s, the designers realized that the new language
was ideal for creating online applications.”).
69
Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1350-51.
65
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Meanwhile, Google independently created its own implementation code for
things like taking square roots. (Any copying of implementation code was
disposed of separately in the case.70 At this stage of the litigation, Google has
redone the implementation code on its own.) The district court noted:
It is the method body that does the heavy lifting, namely the actual work of
taking the inputs, crunching them, and returning an answer. The method
body can be short or long. Google came up with its own implementations
for the method bodies and this accounts for 97 percent of the code for the
37 packages.71
So what Google seeks in the litigation is the ability to empower programmers
to employ Google’s implementation code (to do work the programmers need)
by calling for various functions by means of Java terminology.
Third-party apps are important to the success of any smartphone. The worry
is that a plaintiff victory in this case could get in the way of third-party programs
being able to interoperate easily with the Android platform. Like Java, Google
tries to save third-party programmers from having to rewrite every module. If
third-party programmers have to learn a new set of method headers just to call
on the same functions, some potential cost savings disappear. If, when writing
for Android, the app programmers have to learn a set of synonyms, everyone is
worse off (except maybe the current owner of Java). If the familiar method
headers can be used, by comparison, the amount of necessary rewriting will be
far less. Usually social policy advises against requiring duplication of effort.
There is even a disdainful name for such duplication: “reinventing the wheel.”
Admittedly, the disdain is overstated; there might be social benefit to
reinventing the wheel in some circumstances.72 However, that is not copyright’s
concern. Copyright was crafted to deal with behavior such as copying a sketch
(in which a novel wheel might or might not appear), not with inventing improved
modes of transport.
Similarly, it seems like good policy to enable programs whose main parts are
independently written73 to use occasional conventions popularized by someone
else. However, whether or not it is good policy, the resolution lies with branches
of law having to do with technology, not copyright law.

70

See id.
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 750
F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
72
Increasing a copier’s costs by forcing “reinvention” can help prevent the copier from
selling a product much lower in price than the originator’s product. Determining whether this
is a good idea or not, in particular circumstances, is a matter of empirical investigation, whose
results would be evaluated by policies in patent, media, and technology.
73
The implementation code written independently by Google does the “heavy lifting.”
Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
71
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At the beginning of software’s inclusion into copyright, Congress warned that
expressivity and not technological ingenuity is what’s being protected.74
Admittedly, expressivity and ingenuity may be hard to disentangle, particularly
because both can be elegantly executed. Nevertheless, the thrill of watching
immensely talented people follow their muses should not obscure the truth that
the tasks involved differ.
When on the border between patent federal IP and nonpatent federal IP,
Supreme Court cases consistently remind us that patent policy must govern.75
So if a court is uncertain whether subordinate (nonpatent) doctrines should
protect a functional symbol or design, precedent suggests that doubts should be
resolved against letting the nonpatent law regulate the outcome.76
C.

Does Copyright Law “Clearly Express” a Desire That Courts Should
Impose Liability for Copying That Lacks Normative Significance?

Recall the Brunswick antitrust litigation. When asked to impose antitrust
liability that would yield unproductive results, the Supreme Court has directed
that defendants should prevail unless the governing statute gives “clear
expression” of congressional intent to widen the scope of liability. 77 No such
“clear expression” to disregard statutory purpose appears in the copyright
74

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976) (“[T]he expression adopted by the programmer is
the copyrightable element in a computer program, and . . . the actual processes or methods in
the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.”).
75
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
(“The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability embody a congressional
understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the
rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.”); see also Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 569 (1973) (noting preemption framework and finding that “[t]he
standards established for granting federal patent protection to machines thus indicated not
only which articles in this particular category Congress wished to protect, but which
configurations it wished to remain free”). For patent’s impact on federal trademark law see,
for example, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 43 (2001). For
patent’s impact on federal copyright law, the case law locus classicus is Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99, 102-06 (1880).
76
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (“To the
extent there are close cases, we believe that courts should err on the side of caution and
classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring [the trademark claimant
to prove] secondary meaning.” (emphasis added)).
77
In Brunswick, the Court conceded in dicta that limiting a causation requirement to
merely factual (“but-for” cause) might be possible. However, the Court cautioned, such a step
should be taken only if the statute had a “clear expression” of Congress’s desire to expand
liability beyond the normative nexus. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 488 (1977) (“Of course, Congress is free, if it desires, to mandate damages awards for
all dislocations caused by unlawful mergers despite the peculiar consequences of so doing.
But because of these consequences, ‘we should insist upon a clear expression of a
congressional purpose,’ before attributing such an intent to Congress.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972))).
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statute. To the contrary, copyright is full of provisions that remind courts and
practitioners of the important role that limits on copyright play in achieving the
“Progress” contemplated by the U.S. Constitution.78 In particular, the fair use
doctrine has not only flourished judicially but has also been specifically
approved by Congress.
In negligence law, the principle of limiting liability to those facts that further
statutory purpose is sometimes deployed as a limitation on the “duty” that actors
owe.79 As mentioned, more commonly negligence courts enforce this limiting
principle under the label of “proximate cause.”80
Another formulation of the principle is “antitrust injury,” which is the rubric
the Supreme Court employed when it made explicit that Clayton Act liability
should be limited solely to cases that satisfy the need for normative connection. 81
In copyright law, the principle is embodied in a host of limits and exceptions,82
and, as mentioned, it is embodied in the doctrine that overlaps them all—namely,
the doctrine of “fair use.”83 These embodiments are further discussed below,
after a fuller presentation of the Oracle dispute.
IV. NORMATIVE LIMITS ON LIABILITY IN FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
A.

The Copyright Statutes: Overview of the Oracle Dispute

It will be useful to drop back and give a fuller factual summary of the Oracle
dispute to show how the proximate cause issue arises within it. Oracle purchased
the copyright to Java, a program useful to many programmers, including those
who create apps for smartphones.84 To help its Android phone attract more apps,
Google tried in various ways to emulate Java.85 Through independent coding,
Google created a programs that could implement (carry out) tasks that Java’s
programs also perform.86 Any copying done to create the implementation code,
whether of idea or expression, is no longer in dispute.87
The current stage of the lawsuit tests another type of copying: the verbatim
copying of the method headers Java employed to name and request the tasks to

78

See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See infra Section V.A (discussing leading proximate cause theories in tort law).
80
See infra notes 131-46 and accompanying text (analyzing predominant view in tort law).
81
Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488.
82
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2018).
83
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 8, at 1600 (finding that doctrine of fair
use “renders noninfringing certain uses of copyrighted material that might technically violate
the statute, but which do not violate the statute’s basic purposes”).
84
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, No. 18-956, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2019) (mem.).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
79
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be performed.88 These are essentially command titles, sometimes known as
application program interfaces (“APIs”).89 Oracle sued in copyright because
these keystroke sequences, by coincidence, take the form of letters and other
symbols.90
Google’s reasons for copying the command names had nothing to do with the
communicative qualities of the names. Google wanted third-party programmers
to be able to call upon Google’s Java-like functionality by using the same
keystroke signals programmers use when they call upon the parallel functions in
Java itself.91 It appears that sameness—not expressiveness—was the value
sought. Google would have copied the keystrokes even if Oracle had used totally
arbitrary and meaningless symbols, like the dot dot dot / dash dash dash / dot
dot dot that signals a cry for help in Morse Code.
It therefore appears likely that a proper awareness of proximate cause would
have dictated a decision for the defendants, and the trial court did give the
defendants (and the principle of proximate cause) a victory. But the Federal
Circuit overturned that result. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Oracle
to resolve the interrelated questions of copyrightability and “fair use.”92
B.

The Antitrust Statutes: Refusing to Impose Liability for Fortuitous Losses

As part of the antitrust laws, the Clayton Act is meant to encourage vigorous
competition. Sometimes an illegal merger can cause harm of a kind conceptually
unrelated to a decrease in competition. Should the proximate cause limiting
principle apply and bar plaintiffs from collecting such conceptually unrelated
monies?
At one point, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that any kind of loss
could be collected so long as it was factually traceable (in a but-for sense) to an
“illegal presence” in the market.93 The Supreme Court sharply disagreed,
viewing losses unrelated to the purposes of the statute as “entirely fortuitous.” 94
As explained above, the plaintiffs in Brunswick complained that a merger had
resulted in their experiencing more competition, not less.95 To have let the

88

Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1185-86.
Id. at 1186.
90
Id. I doubt that I am the first to notice that a similar fortuity gave rise to the dispute in
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880) (“In describing the art, the illustrations and diagrams
employed happen to correspond more closely than usual with the actual work performed by
the operator who uses the art.” (emphasis added)).
91
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1187-88.
92
See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 18-956, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov. 15,
2019).
93
NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
94
Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 487.
95
Id. at 481.
89
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plaintiffs prevail would obviously have been counterproductive. As the Court
wrote:
[R]espondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers petitioner
preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of
increased concentration. The damages respondents [sought] are designed
to provide them with the profits they would have realized had competition
been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for “the
protection of competition, not competitors.” It is inimical to the purposes
of these laws to award damages for the type of injury claimed here.96
The Brunswick decision took as its touchstone a principle broader than
avoiding counterproductive liability. The Court goes further, emphasizing that a
“but-for” test of factual causation is inadequate; such an approach “divorces
antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust laws without a clear
statutory command to do so.”97 Rather, to be actionable, the injury must be “of
the type the antitrust law was intended to prevent”;98 it must have “[some]thing
to do with the reason the merger was condemned.”99 Relying solely on factual
causation, wrote the Court, “would make . . . recovery entirely fortuitous, and
would authorize damages for losses which are of no concern to the antitrust
laws.”100 Stepping beyond the counterproductive nature of the relief sought, the
Court implied that the plaintiffs should have lost even had the antitrust laws been
“merely indifferent to the injury claimed.”101
In short, the Court took a back-to-basics approach that reinstated the standard
principle that forbade imposing liability “for losses which are of no concern to
the antitrust laws.”102 In turn, wrote the Court:
We therefore hold that for plaintiffs to recover . . . they must prove more
than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs
must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust

96

Id. at 488 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
97
Id. at 487.
98
Id. at 489.
99
Id. at 487.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
102
Id. Sounding remarkably similar to judges in negligence actions, the Court further
wrote:
[U]nder the Court of Appeals’ holding, once a merger is found to violate § 7, all
dislocations caused by the merger are actionable, regardless of whether those
dislocations have anything to do with the reason the merger was condemned. This
holding would make § 4 recovery entirely fortuitous, and would authorize damages for
losses which are of no concern to the antitrust laws.
Id.
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laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful.103
Virtually echoing proximate cause doctrine, the Court wrote that for recovery
of a loss to be proper, “[i]t should, in short, be ‘the type of loss that the claimed
violations . . . would be likely to cause.’”104
V.
A.

WHY DO LIMITING PRINCIPLES MATTER?

Copyright Requires Limits

If copyright law were a movie monster, it would be thirteen feet tall and take
over the whole screen. Equipped with time-travel talons, it extracts duties from
its contemporaries’ yet unborn great-grandchildren105 and drags expired
copyrights zombie-like from the public domain.106
But copyright was not always a dangerous creature. Most observers diagnose
congressional vulnerability to interest-group pressure as the primary cause of
copyright’s dreadful hypertrophy.107 One potential route for slimming copyright
back to effectiveness is judicial rather than legislative. Copyright courts could
employ proximate cause as a model for determining whether a plaintiff has made
a prima facie showing that the defendant’s behavior lies within the plaintiff’s
exclusive scope of the copyright. As in negligence law’s proximate cause
doctrine, courts should deny plaintiffs a victory in those cases where harnessing
the behavior complained of would not be likely to provide desired incentives.
Limiting principles are important not only because of copyright’s swollen
presence but also because proximate cause amounts to a demand for fit between
legal policy and particular facts. Doctrines like trespass that govern property in
land have a low threshold; not much fit is required to penalize an entry. 108 As

103
Id. at 489 (first and third emphases added). This case is also usefully discussed in Mark
A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 100 B.U. L. REV. 71 (2020).
104
Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489 (omission in original) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)).
105
Most copyrights now endure for seventy years after the author’s death. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (2018). Therefore, for example, adult grandchildren might inherit from an eightyyear-old author her copyright in a book she wrote in her youth sixty years before. At the
grandmother’s death, the copyright will still have seventy years to run, for a total duration of
130 years.
106
Restoration of many foreign citizens’ expired U.S. copyrights is mandated by 17 U.S.C.
§ 104A. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 38B: RESTORATION UNDER THE URAA
1 (2013), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38b.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ6J-SGDY]
(explaining restoration).
107
See, e.g., Louis Menand, Crooner in Rights Spat: Are Copyright Laws Too Strict?, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 20, 2014, at 84, 88 (contending that “[a]t bottom, the argument about copyright
is not really a philosophical argument. It’s a battle between interest groups”).
108
See Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction,
122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 69-70 (2009) [hereinafter Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels].
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compared with the law of physical property, copyright has long mandated a
higher degree of fit before liability could be imposed. Negligence law similarly
demands a degree of fit higher than that required by trespass.
B.

Negligence Law’s “Proximate Cause” Doctrine Informs Copyright’s
“Fair Use” Doctrine

As law students learn when they first meet the unforeseeably injured plaintiff
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,109 legal rights and their correlative duties
have limits.110 “Proximate cause” is another common law formulation of the
same principle. Both doctrines are part of negligence law, the main goal of which
is to incentivize careful behavior. By insisting on “duty” and “proximate cause,”
negligence courts respond to that central goal by declining to impose liability
for injuries that, being unforeseeable, no one can be incentivized to avoid. 111
U.S. copyright law has far more inbuilt limits than does negligence law,112
which is appropriate given the central contribution that copying makes to
cultural life. The most general label for these limits is “fair use.” Just as
negligence courts should invoke “lack of duty” or “lack of proximate cause”
when liability would fail to induce the community to take appropriate
precautions, copyright courts should find “fair use” and decline to impose
liability that would fail to induce expressive creativity.
Employing common law analogy to illuminate statutory regimes is not always
appropriate. One of the factors that makes a negligence-law analogy helpful for
analyzing federal copyright is that litigation over copyright infringement shares
a key characteristic with common law litigation over accidents: both are
structured around a claim of factual causation—what Professor Weinrib would
call a “correlative” relation linked by doing and impact.113 Duplication of a
109

162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Palsgraf ruled that railroad employees helping an individual to board the train had no
“duty” to take reasonable care to avoid injuring someone standing far off. She was hit by an
unusual combination of circumstances. Id. at 101.
111
Cf. Justin Hughes, Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and Unforeseen, 122 HARV.
L. REV. F. 81, 94-95 (2009) (noting “gaming” costs associated with case-by-case
foreseeability analysis in copyright law).
112
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2018) (establishing multiple limitations to copyright).
113
Common law cases usually involve two parties, one of whom has changed the other’s
position. Of the various noneconomic approaches to law, “corrective justice” pays particular
attention to this causal link. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 14, at 520.
The distinction between economic and noneconomic views of litigation structure can be
overstated, however. Many economic analysts of law also find it useful to follow the causation
chain. For example, the economic notion of “externality” is a caused effect that a causal agent
does not feel. Thus, to “internalize” a negative externality is to make a harm causer pay for
costs they have causally imposed on others; to “internalize” a positive externality is to require
persons who have causally benefited from the actions of another to pay the benefit causer. On
economic views of the common law, see generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW (9th ed. 2014) (1977).
110
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copyrighted work causes no infringement unless the plaintiff can show that the
defendant somehow borrowed (“copied”) from the plaintiff’s work. That is the
same as requiring the plaintiff to show that use of the copyrighted work was a
factual cause of what the defendant was able to do.114 If but for the contact with
plaintiff’s work, the defendant’s work product would have taken a different
form, then copying (or factual causation) is proven. If contact with the plaintiff’s
work made no difference, then there is no cause, no copying, and no liability.
By contrast, in patent law, inventors are often found liable for practicing
innovations that they independently conceived but that happen to duplicate
something patented.115 In U.S. trademark law, too, a factual causal connection
need not be present in order for liability to arise; someone who happens by
coincidence to use a symbol or name in commerce that confusingly resembles a
previously established unregistered mark can infringe, even if the defendant can
prove she had never seen or heard the senior mark.116
To benefit from someone else’s efforts or resources without paying them is to
take a “free ride.” In neither patent law nor trademark law is proof of free riding
required.117 Lacking the causality fulcrum of free riding or injury, then, patent
and trademark are accordingly less likely than copyright to benefit from being
114
It does not suffice for liability that a copyright owner can show similarities between the
copyrighted work and the defendant’s product or performance. The similarities must result
from copying. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“Of course, if there
are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will suffice to prove copying. If there is
evidence of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether
the similarities are sufficient to prove copying.”); see also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[I]f by some magic a man who had never
known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and,
if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem . . . . [J]ust as he is no less an ‘author’
because others have preceded him, so another who follows him, is not a tort-feasor unless he
pirates his work.” (emphases added)).
115
Only in a narrow class of patent cases will lack of causation (independent invention)
shelter a patent defendant from liability. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (providing for two exceptions to requirement of novelty). When similar inventions
arise near the same time, the cause is unlikely to be pure “coincidence.” At different states of
science, many teams may be working to solve a salient puzzle.
116
Federal trademark registration will, of course, give a remote user reason to know the
senior mark exists. However, even without federal registration, a trademark plaintiff
sometimes succeeds against a business that uses a word or symbol confusingly similar to the
plaintiff’s mark, even though the defendant acted in good faith and did no copying. See, e.g.,
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415-19 (1916) (finding that only under
defined circumstances will senior trademark owner lack rights to proceed against good-faith
user).
117
Patent law gives rights against anyone who duplicates the invention, however
independently and harmlessly. (There might be, however, some defense for experimental use.
See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).)
Contemporary trademark law asks only for proof of “likelihood of confusion,” not actual
injury. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
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viewed through a common law lens. Suits against independent inventors and
noncopyist trademark users may even fall out of the corrective justice model. 118
What makes this particularly interesting is that in copyright law, as in
negligence law, factual cause is a necessary but not sufficient basis for
liability.119 In negligence, an actor is not liable for injuries that she factually
caused by her negligent act if the peril that eventuated had only a coincidental
relation to the risks that made her act carelessly.120 The reason for the plaintiff’s
loss in such instances is usually termed “a lack of proximate cause.”121 The same
label is also used to express the judgment that a negligent actor should not be
liable into infinity to all the potential plaintiffs who might experience an injury
that can be factually traced to that actor’s carelessness.122 At some point, other
actors will have more influence on outcomes, and courts will find the distant
injuries insufficiently “proximate” to the initial negligent act.
Much the same logic that generates these limits in negligence law helps to
explain why a creative author cannot use her copyright to claim a reward from
everyone who experiences a benefit factually traceable to copying the author’s
work. In the face of impacts that are remote, coincidental, or otherwise irrelevant
to policy, crafting legal remedies generates few benefits and many costs. 123 The

118
See Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV.
609, 615-16 (1992). A devil’s advocate might say that even if the defendant has gained
nothing from the plaintiff, they may have inflected injury on the plaintiff, and that should
suffice for a causal nexus.
119
Not only is fit addressed by available copyright defenses, such as fair use, but in
addition a copyright plaintiff must prove wrongfulness, sometimes known by the label
“substantial similarity.” This wrongfulness does not fully correspond to ordinary moral fault
(for even unconscious copying can incur infringement liability) but rather reflects copyright’s
incentive goals—namely, whether the copying interferes with the incentives the law seeks to
create. Thus, the reaction of audience members is key. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472-73
(“Assuming that adequate proof is made of copying, that is not enough; for there can be
‘permissible copying,’ copying which is not illicit. . . . The question . . . is whether defendant
took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners . . . that
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.” (emphases
added) (footnote omitted)).
120
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
121
See id. cmt. f.
122
Id. cmt. d (“[Proximate cause] serves the purpose of avoiding what might be unjustified
or enormous liability by confining the liability’s scope to the reasons for holding the actor
liable in the first place.”).
123
Administrative costs are not the only issue. Overcentralizing legal incentives can leave
some actors without reason or ability to act. For example, internalizing all negative effects to
negligent drivers may make pedestrians careless; internalizing all positive effects to initial
copyright owners can discourage creativity in later generations of artists. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Copyright and Tort as Mirror Models: On Not Mistaking for the Right Hand What
the Left Hand Is Doing, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 311, 311-12 (Theodore
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central lesson is in the fit between the facts of particular cases and the purposes
of the law: restricting liability to cases where liability is likely to yield the kind
of changes at which the law aims.
Copyright already employs notions of fit, but the application is sporadic and
sometimes suffers from being unspoken. It can learn from “fit” as applied in
negligence law—that is, fit between the facts of a particular case and the
problems of incentives that the negligence tort was primarily meant to address.
Personal-injury law and copyright law bear a close relationship to each other.
The relationship is symmetrical but inverse, as in a mirror.124 Just as harms are
a target for tort policy, benefits are a target for copyright policy. 125 This Article
also reviews some potential objections that might be raised against using the
personal injury tort of negligence as a model for copyright.
1.

Negligence Law’s Goal of Deterrence Mirrors Copyright’s Goal of
Incentivizing Creative Production

The inquiry into tort law may seem an odd model for copyright, since in the
two doctrines most factors are reversed.126 Consider the roles of plaintiff and
defendant. In negligence law, the usual focus is on giving incentives to the
defendant (the injurer). In copyright, the usual focus is on giving incentives to
Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello eds., 2016) [hereinafter Gordon, Copyright and Tort as
Mirror Models] (discussing mirrored policy goals of negligence law and copyright).
124
See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image: “Harms,”
“Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003)
[hereinafter Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image] (discussing similarities between
tort law and copyright).
125
Thus, the tort of negligence, which deals with accidental injuries of this kind, is seen
as a law governing harms or loss. By contrast, receiving royalties is usually seen as receiving
a benefit or a gain. Similarly, a person who sues to be paid for unrequested services that she
has rendered is likely to be seen as seeking a benefit or a gain. Thus, copyright law (which
provides royalties) and restitution law (which on rare occasions imposes liability on the
recipient of unrequested benefits) can both be seen as laws that govern gains. See Wendy J.
Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78
VA. L. REV. 149, 228-29 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning Information].
In that light, a copyist who has not paid for reproductions is not necessarily doing a harm
to the copyright owner; he more plausibly might be said to be withholding a benefit. As the
behavioral research suggests, people tend to fear foregoing a benefit less strongly than they
fear an out-of-pocket loss in the same amount. See Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels,
supra note 108, at 69-70 (discussing empirical research).
Admittedly, once out of the realm of physical damage, characterizing a prospect as harm
or benefit becomes more contestable. For example, after a steady stream of royalty income
has commenced for long enough to become a reference point, the person receiving the income
is likely to perceive any diminution in revenue flow as a loss rather than merely a benefit that
she is foregoing. Nevertheless, copyright is best seen as a law of benefits, I think, because that
is how it would have been perceived historically when the decisions were first made to extend
authorial control beyond the point at which the author could physically control the manuscript.
126
See Gordon, Copyright and Tort as Mirror Models, supra note 123, at 330.
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the plaintiff (the creator of the work, her assignee, or her employer). In torts,
duty is emphasized; in copyright law, rights are emphasized. In negligence, the
effects to be internalized by the primary actor are negative: the injurer should be
forced to take account of the injury caused. In copyright, the effects to be
internalized by the primary actor are positive: the value a copyrighted work gives
to society should be something its author should be empowered to harness.
The reversals continue: negligence primarily uses the law as a stick, while
copyright primarily uses the law as a carrot. To the extent moral responsibility
plays a role, the same reversal occurs. The moral fulcrum of personal injury law
is a kind of fault,127 while the moral fulcrum of copyright is a kind of merit. Fault
warrants liability, while merit deserves reward. And so on.
Nevertheless, each area of law seeks to bring to bear the consequences of an
individual’s actions on his or her decision-making. The effects in question might
be negative, like a broken leg, or positive, like enjoyment of art, but the policy
concern is the same: in the absence of the law, important actors might behave
unproductively or wastefully because effects that they cause might mean nothing
to their pocketbooks.128
The relationship between copyright and tort is like the relationship between a
face and its reflection in a mirror. Looking into the mirror, the left ear appears
as if it were on the right side and vice versa. Such reversals might cause
occasional blunders, but if the reversal is properly taken into account, a mirror
provides extremely accurate information. Similarly, the common law’s long
acquaintance with torts (a law of harms) can provide extremely helpful
information about this newly important expansive thing called copyright (a law
of benefits).

127
I say it is a “kind of” fault (rather that fault tout court) because negligence law has
elements that are insensitive to a particular defendant’s limitations. Someone can be trying
his best and still be negligent. See Weinrib, supra note 113, at 519. Similarly, copyright
extends its rights regardless of the work’s merit, except at the extremes; judges long ago
announced they are reluctant to judge the quality of artwork. Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
128
See Gordon, Copyright and Tort as Mirror Models, supra note 123, at 312 (“The policy
logic of copyright like the policy logic of torts focuses on using internalization to produce
incentives, but copyright emphasizes the harnessing of positive rather than negative
externalities, that is, copyright’s focus is primarily on encouraging rather than discouraging
particular activities.”); see also Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image, supra note
124, at 534-35 (discussing internalization of risks and benefits as goal of tort law and
copyright law, respectively); Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note 33, at 403-07 (arguing
that “fit” is required to achieve appropriate level of liability); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual
Property Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 622 (Peter Cane & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2003) (“IP law encourages persons to become more productive by allowing
them to capture some of the benefits their useful behavior gives to others.”).
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Each Doctrine Seeks to Advance the Multiple Goals of Corrective
Justice, Aligning Economic Incentives, and Ensuring Judicial
Efficiency

Many everyday torts, like auto accidents and medical malpractice, are
governed by the tort of negligence. Negligence law leaves many injured persons
without recourse. Earlier I quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., defending such
results: “[C]umbrous and expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion
unless some clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo.”129
The “cumbrous and expensive machinery” Holmes envisions is lawmaking
and adjudication. What can justify setting this imperfect and costly machinery
into motion is a “clear benefit.” Implicitly, the nature of the relevant benefit will
be defined by the purposes a particular law seeks to achieve. Within negligence
law, proximate cause is a doctrine that limits the imposition of liability to cases
where the impact of imposing liability is sufficiently clear to satisfy Holmes’s
demand for some clear benefit.
This principled limit on liability can be defended both in terms of corrective
justice and in terms of economic incentives.130 The proximate cause doctrine
implicitly tells courts (and sometimes juries) to avoid imposing damages when
the prospect of such liability will be unlikely to induce risk-reducing behavior
and instead to restrict liability to instances where imposing liability for the
allegedly bad act will encourage cost-justified precautions.
Recall the driver who was delayed by some rubble negligently dropped into
the road by a roofer. Had there been no rubble to slow him down, the driver
would have been through a particular intersection before lightning struck there
or anyone drove through the stop sign. It was only the delay caused by the
roofer’s negligence that placed the driver at the intersection at the worst possible
129

HOLMES, supra note 12, at 96.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 30
(setting forth basic requirement that plaintiff should prevail on given set of facts if liability
imposed on defendant delivers incentives that will reduce hazards). Comments (a) and (b) to
section 30 indicate that the proximate cause limitation is based in corrective justice concerns
as well as concerns with ex ante incentives. See id. cmt. a (“When tortious conduct does not
generally increase the risk of the type of harm that occurred, the wrongful aspect of the actor’s
conduct is merely serendipitous or coincidental in causing the harm.”); id. cmt. b (“This
limitation on scope of liability contributes both to appropriate incentives for deterrence and
to affirming corrective justice concerns.”). Related to corrective justice is the notion of
“juridical integrity.” Professor Drassinower uses the latter to argue that a law concerned with
communication should only impose liability when the defendant communicates. See
DRASSINOWER, supra note 19, at 8 (“Copyright law protects the integrity of the work as a
communicative act. . . . [C]opyright infringement is wrongful because it is compelled
speech.”); see also Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1607, 1682 (2009) (“[A]cts of copying which do not communicate the author’s original
expression to the public should not generally be held to constitute copyright infringement.”).
Professor Drassinower’s analysis of the explanation/use distinction has influenced my
discussion infra Sections V.B.1 and V.B.3.
130
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moment. Therefore, the roofer’s negligence is a “but-for” or “factual” cause of
the driver’s injuries. Yet most American courts would not require the roofer to
pay compensation. This is because changing the behavior of roofers will have
no impact on accidents involving lightning or being hit by speeding scofflaws.
As the Third Restatement of Torts puts it: “[T]he harm that occurred must be one
that results from the hazards that made the defendant’s conduct tortious in the
first place.”131
Exercising a society’s expensive judicial machinery when the result will
encourage productive or otherwise desirable behavioral change adds social value
that may outweigh the administrative costs involved in litigation.132 This added
value is lacking when liability is imposed in ways that are unlikely to encourage
changes in how people and companies behave.
Because the primary goal of negligence law is usually taken to be reduction
of unintentionally caused injuries, risk reduction is the main “clear benefit”
sought. Therefore, proximate cause doctrine asks of a particular set of facts:
“Can one see that using the precaution would have significantly reduced the
incidence of that kind of accident?”133 One cannot see that proper roofing
precautions will make a difference to such random accidents. If avoiding the
negligent act would not have “significantly reduced the incidence of that kind of
accident,” then “proximate cause bars liability.” 134
From a corrective justice perspective, one might say that the relation between
roofer and driver was wrongful only in regard to a kind of risk that did not occur.
The rubble did not hit the driver in the head, scratch his car, or break his
windshield. Had any of that occurred, the driver could have successfully sued
the roofer. However, the roofer’s conduct only caused injury through a freakish
risk that was no part of what made his behavior negligent.
The Third Restatement of Torts summarizes the negligence doctrine this way:
“An actor is not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct
was of a type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm.” 135 Imposing
liability is likely to be not only costly when the unjustified aspect of the conduct
is unrelated to the harm caused but also wasteful (at least in the absence of other
factors such as asymmetries between the parties in information, risk aversion, or
utility functions for money).136 Proximate cause is not the only formulation that

131
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
132
See generally Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2002)
(discussing value of proximate cause doctrine).
133
Id. at 323 (explaining that liability is only imposed where relationship exists between
accident and “untaken precaution”).
134
Id.
135
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 30.
136
In areas where defendants are likely to have better information and less risk aversion
than plaintiffs, strict liability tends to be used rather than negligence. See A. MITCHELL
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courts employ to limit the scope of negligence liability. It can also be expressed
as a limitation on “duty.”137 The “duty” formulation can also be stated in terms
of its correlative: determining the scope of the plaintiff’s right to complain. The
result is the same.138 Courts will make negligent injurers pay for harm they cause
only “when the tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct was of a type” the
elimination of which “generally [decreases] the risk of that harm.” 139 When
making defendants pay would not decrease the type of harm that occurred in a
particular instance, proximate cause denies the plaintiff relief.
Another way that negligence law shows the importance of fitting legal results
to the factual context involves defining what behaviors violate the standard of
reasonable care. Criminal or regulatory statutes often prohibit behavior that also
causes accidents, but a physical identity between the criminally prohibited
behavior and the behavior of the defendant in a civil negligence suit does not
automatically lead to finding the defendant negligent. Violating a criminal or
regulatory duty will be irrelevant to assessing whether behavior satisfies the
negligence tort’s standard of care unless the statute in question aims to
ameliorate the same dangers as those that arose in the particular case. 140
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 95-104 (1983) (discussing liability for
product defects).
137
Judge Cardozo famously used a “duty” rather than a “proximate cause” formulation.
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (denying relief on ground
that defendant owed no duty to someone standing far away from negligent act). The
significance of classifying this as a question of duty is at least partly procedural: questions of
duty are for the judge while questions of proximate cause can be decided by juries. This
Article does not proceed beyond that procedural distinction. The reader should, however, be
aware that storms of controversy surround duty in tort law, including disputes over whether
negligence duties do serve (as I think they do) or should serve (as I think they should)
instrumentalist social and economic purposes as well as purposes of individual redress. See,
e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 671-73
(2008) (discussing splits in views of duty element of negligence tort); John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart
on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1581-91 (2006) (discussing objections to
formulating tort law in terms of genuine duties).
138
Limits on rights (by definition) correspondingly reduce the scope of the correlative
duties, just as changes in duties work a corresponding change in rights. See WESLEY
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36-38 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (exploring
correlative nature of “right” and “duty”).
139
The quoted language is from a Restatement principle that describes when liability will
not be imposed; I have reworded the principle to emphasize when imposition would instead
be proper. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 30 (“An actor is not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct
was of a type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm.”).
140
Id. § 14 (“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is
designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and if the accident
victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.” (emphases added)).
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Objections to the Parallel: Losses and Foregone License Fees; Harms
and Benefits; Duties and Rights

Negligence law emphasizes duties (owed to defendants), and copyright law
emphasizes rights (held by plaintiffs). Although the words “right” and “duty”
are correlatives, each has different connotations141 and thus potentially different
framing effects.142 Perceiving that the public owes the author a duty to refrain
from copying her works without permission, for example, is not necessarily
psychologically or behaviorally the same as perceiving that the author has an
exclusive right over the reproduction of her works. That asymmetry in
perception needs to be taken into account when drawing on tort law to better
understand copyright law.143 It is my view that fair use should be more
demanding than proximate cause, for proximate cause doctrine can leave injured
parties without redress while fair use often does no more than deprive plantiffs
of potential licensing fees.
In addition, a plethora of experiments over the last few years has indicated
that many people do not respond symmetrically to gain and loss. The tendency
is for a greater impact on utility to result from the prospect of paying out-ofpocket costs (e.g., paying a liability judgment) than from the prospect of

That a criminal statute is relevant only if its goals fit the goals of negligence law reinforces
the point that behaviors have legal significance depending on context. Copying that is rightful
in one context may be wrongful in another.
141
This claim may seem odd in light of Wesley Hohfeld’s familiar conclusion that in
private law duty and right are inseparable conceptual correlatives; per his view, duties can
logically be inferred from rights and vice versa. That is, every right can be redefined in terms
of its correlative duty, and every duty can be redefined in terms of its correlative rights. See
HOHFELD, supra note 138, at 38 (“[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s
land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place.”
(emphasis added)).
142
Professors Kahneman and Tversky provide several examples of how a given choice can
be reframed in terms of either gain or loss. Daniel Kahneman & Aaron Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342-44 (1984), reprinted in DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 433, 436-44 app. B (2011) (describing how people’s
acceptance of risk is altered by framing outcomes as either gains or losses).
143
The person who has rights tends to think mainly in terms of the rights they have rather
than the burdens their rights impose on others. Conversely, the person who bears duties tends
to think mainly of the obligations they have rather than of the benefits to others the duties will
generate.
It is telling that for each of these two fields of law—copyright and negligence—the courts
and litigants employ language that characterizes the viewpoints of the parties in these terms.
Thus, that negligence law is usually formulated in terms of a defendant’s duty of reasonable
care reinforces the consistent message of negligence law that its focus is on incentivizing
defendants. Similarly, that copyright law is usually formulated in terms of a plaintiff’s rights
reinforces the consistent message of copyright law that its focus is on incentivizing plaintiffs.
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foregoing a benefit (e.g., not receiving a payment). 144 Depending on how robust
a finding this turns out to be in relevant contexts, loss aversion and other
apparent gain/loss asymmetries suggest that perhaps tort law should be stronger
than copyright law in imposing liability. 145 If lack of proximate cause eliminates
liability in the stronger law of harms, then a fortiori the same principles should
also eliminate liability for the putatively weaker law of benefits that we call
copyright.
C.

How to Choose the Level of Fit: Guidance Needed

The negligence tort is hardly the only locus where the law demands a
proximate connection between its purpose and the impact of imposing liability
in particular cases. It is rooted in due process: the facts of a case must fit closely
enough to a law’s rationale for the application of law to make sense.146 However,
many factors affect how close a fit is required. In constitutional challenges to
statutes, courts debate the “level of scrutiny” explicitly, 147 but even in ordinary
144

See EDWARD CARTWRIGHT, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 40-42, 396 (1st ed. 2011). But see,
e.g., Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics
and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2, 3 (2013) (arguing that “recent experimental data
have cast doubt on the hypothesis that ownership sets the reference point and loss aversion
generates reluctance to trade”).
145
In addition, common observation suggests that most people seem to fear losses more
than they dislike foregoing a benefit. One might wonder if the apparently greater importance
Americans give to avoiding harm (as opposed to seeking benefits) undermines the legitimacy
of copyright, for at bottom copyright operates as a law that facilitates payment for benefits.
Such speculation at first glance appears ratified by the common law of restitution, also known
as unjust enrichment. This body of law is reluctant to award relief in most cases of volunteered
benefits, which stands in sharp contrast to some courts’ willingness to order relief in cases of
harms caused. However, further research persuaded me that the difference in treatment was
best explained not by differences between harm and benefit but rather by concerns such as
preserving autonomy and avoiding harm. See Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits:
Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 465 (1992); see also
Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 125, at 279-80 (discussing validity of, and
desirable limits on, restitutionary principles in intellectual property contexts).
146
As congressional enactments must, at a minimum, satisfy review for constitutionality,
so must judicially created rules. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964)
(applying strict scrutiny to defamation law).
147
Compare, for example, the different positions on “levels of scrutiny” taken by majority
and dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court case upholding an extension of copyright
duration. 537 U.S. 186, 195-222 (2003) (applying rational basis review to act extending
copyright duration and recognizing it as part of Congress’s enforcement powers of Copyright
Clause); id. at 222-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s actions under
Copyright Clause are unreviewable by judiciary and finding statute beyond congressional
authority); id. at 244-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing need for higher scrutiny because
“this statute involves not pure economic regulation, but regulation of expression, and what
may count as rational where economic regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational where
we focus on expression”).
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cases, where judges are asked not to invalidate but to interpret, judges have to
choose a level of scrutiny, either explicitly or implicitly. Analogy can be useful
for this task.
What makes issues of fit particularly difficult is that more tailoring isn’t
necessarily better. Perfect fit would mean that legal outcomes would vary with
extreme sensitivity to circumstances. A legal system that embraced such close
tailoring could be particularly vulnerable to abuse because it can be difficult to
identify or prove culpable bias by a judge or jury when outcomes normally vary
case by case. Moreover, with rules that penalize physically identical behaviors
differently in different contexts, it might be difficult to give the public the kind
of notice about law that is fundamental both to sensible planning and to
fairness.148 Laws must be somewhat general and unparticularized to enable the
populace to understand them, to save excessive costs of processing disputes, and
to foster courts’ abilities to treat like cases alike.149
In short, courts can demand too much as well as too little in the way of fit.
Because there is no easy answer about how closely courts should require
particular facts to fit the law’s purpose,150 use of heuristics and analogy can be
helpful for developments, such as copyright’s recent hypertrophy, that are newly
struggling with these issues. American copyright law has good reasons for
looking to negligence law for analogy on this issue.151
1.

Functional Uses Are Outside the Scope of a Copyright Owner’s Rights
of Control

Of the various copying behaviors that lie outside copyright’s concern,
copying for functional use is perhaps the most important. The Supreme Court
has often emphasized the many distinctions that Congress has drawn between
copyright law and patent law.152 Patent’s short term (rather than copyright’s long
term) and difficulty of acquisition (rather than copyright’s automatic
acquisition) reflect a far different judgment about how best to incentivize or
148

See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24-25 (2000) (discussing
information costs arising from rights with uncertain legal boundaries).
149
Another factor that might explain why law cannot demand perfect fit for all fact patterns
is a concern with legitimacy and perceptions of fairness; many citizens would complain if, for
example, a driver who was able to persuade a court of her expertise at the wheel could escape
liability for having caused injury when driving at seventy-five miles per hour, when sixty
miles per hour would have been the speed considered “reasonable” for ordinary folks.
150
There is a rich literature comparing the virtues and weaknesses of rules versus
standards, exploration of which would take us too far afield. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992) (arguing that rules
reduce cost of frequent undesirable conduct).
151
Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1409, 1421-29 (2012) (calling for pluralistic approaches to law).
152
See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-06 (1880) (noting distinctions between
patents on processes and methods and copyrights on original works of authorship).
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reward works of authorship as opposed to inventions and how to treat a
defendant’s behavior that is communicative as opposed to functional.153
In the leading case of Baker v. Selden,154 the Supreme Court distinguished
between a copyright owner’s powers to prevent unauthorized copying for
purposes like explanation, contemplation, and entertainment on the one hand
and, on the other, a copyright owner’s attempts to use copyright to extract profit
from uses that serve the ends that patent law155 rather than copyright law was
crafted to manage.156 The law of copyright is for encouraging expression, and
its domain is creativity; the law of patent is for encouraging technology, and its
domain is innovation.
The language “functional” or “utilitarian” is often applied to the items
covered by utility patents. Examples include a wide range of inventions, such as
new forms of lighting, new pharmaceuticals, new jet engines, and new
computerized processes.157 A book that teaches how to build a novel mousetrap
can have copyright, but copyright controls only the expression of the
instructions. It gives no control over carrying the instructions out.158 An inventor
turns to other doctrines, notably utility patent, to keep someone from actually
building the mousetrap so described.
The scope of a copyright extends only to explanation, appearance,
conveyance of information, and the like, not to functional use of the kind that is
the concern of utility patent.159 The former use of copyright is appropriate; the
latter constitutes an intrusion on areas where there is no fit between the law and
the behavior sought to be controlled. The rights of a copyright owner do not
extend to controlling copying for functional uses.160
153
See Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L.
REV. 613, 648-50 (2014) (distinguishing decisions investors must make about disclosure from
creators’ incentives to disclose works of authorship).
154
101 U.S. 99 (1880).
155
My focus in this text is on utility patents. Federal patent law also contains design
patents, which address aesthetic shapes for utilitarian objects, and plant patents. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 161, 171 (2018).
156
Baker, 101 U.S. at 100-01.
157
Nevertheless, contemporary debate surrounds the patentability of computer software.
See, e.g., Jonathan Stroud & Derek M. Kim, Debugging Software Patents After Alice, 69 S.C.
L. REV. 177, 178 (2017) (noting that debate over patentability of software because it is
“difficult to describe in traditional patent claims (due in part to lack of any requirement to
provide enabled computer code when applying for patent protection), the patent office has
struggled with the contours of software patentability, while courts have struggled with
interpreting software claims and applying them to actual technologies in infringement cases”).
158
See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03.
159
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (stating that copyright does not extend to “any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”).
160
In Baker, the Supreme Court explained that copyright was not crafted with utilitarian
applications in mind. Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03. Utilitarian applications are, roughly,
functions other than conveying information or portraying appearance. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
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To Have a Copyright Is Not to Have the Right to Control All Uses

To implement Baker, Congress commissioned Copyright Office Reports
(“Reports”). One important Report in 1961 reviewed the case law and found that
courts were not imposing liability when manufacturers copied from copyrighted
drawings, blueprints, or scale models to make working, life-size, functional
products.161 Often citing Baker itself, those Reports recognized that granting
exclusivity that restrained functional behavior was patent law’s province. 162 As
the 1961 Report summarized, “[C]opyright protection would not extend
to . . . [a] copyrighted scale model of an automobile, used to manufacture
automobiles of that design” or a “copyrighted technical drawing showing the
construction of a machine, used to manufacture the machine.”163 Congress set
out to implement the 1961 Report.
Congress implemented the principle in the following provision:
This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that
portrays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to
the making, distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than
those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 or the common
law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held
applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 164
Section 113(b) addresses the rights that attach to a “portrayal” (such as the
scale model or technical model just mentioned) that depicts “a useful article as

(defining “useful article”). Copyright’s easy acquisition and long duration were adapted for
works of communication and authorship, not for efforts of inventorship and utility. The latter,
as Congress has indicated and as myriad courts since Baker have ratified, should be left to
patent law because of patent’s requirement of administrative preapproval requirements,
standards of novelty and nonobviousness, and short duration. For further discussion, see
Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note 33, at 389-91 (explaining that Baker and its progeny
rejected copyright claims on systems and results because patent is more suited to protecting
those interests).
161
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 14 (1961), http://www.copyright.gov
/history/1961_registers_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8SN-YPDZ] [hereinafter 1961 R EPORT
OF THE REGISTER] (“[E]xisting court decisions indicate that copyright in the ‘work of art’ does
not protect against manufacture of the useful article portrayed.”).
162
See, e.g., id. at 13-14.
163
Id. at 14. The 1961 Report was approved in the 1965 Supplementary Report. H.R.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, pt. 6,
at ix, 47-49, 81 (1965). Congress, in turn, relied upon that Report in the drafting of § 113(b)
of the Copyright Act of 1976. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 105 (1976).
164
17 U.S.C. § 113(b).
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such.”165 The provision then declares that the case law in existence prior to the
effective date of the section continues to be authoritative thereafter.166
What makes the statute clearer are the examples presented by legislative
history. A “copyright in a drawing or model of an automobile” was not supposed
to “give the artist the exclusive right to make automobiles of the same design.”167
This is significant in light of the fact that copyright in a two-dimensional
drawing ordinarily gives its owner rights to control three-dimensional sculptures
based on it.168 Section 113(b), set out above, is a particular application of
proximate cause: copyright’s deference to patent law as well as copyright’s
inherently limited purposes disable an ordinarily applicable derivative-work
right when the result would be to allow copyright law to control functional
behaviors.169 The statute is particularly interesting because it makes clear that
limits on copyrightability are not the only ways in which copyright must defer
to patent law. Even copyrightable works of authorship are affected by patent
law’s primacy. As with lack of duty and lack of proximate cause in negligence
law, behaviors outside the governing law’s concern should be outside a
plaintiff’s “scope of right.”
However, the copyright statute says none of this clearly. Unfortunately,
§ 113(b) is obscure, incorporating prior law by reference. And that means that
courts sometimes ignore both the statute and the important prior case law,
including Baker, from which it emerged.170

165

Id.
The language in § 113(b) was enacted as part of the Copyright Act of 1976, which
became effective January 1, 1978. See Copyright Law Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598-99. Therefore, the reference in § 113(b) to law “in effect on
December 31, 1977,” is a reference to law as it existed just prior to § 113(b) becoming
effective. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(b).
167
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 105.
168
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (granting exclusive right to prepare derivative works). If the threedimensional work is not “useful” in the statutory sense, then the concern with patent drops
away, and someone making a nonuseful derivative work does need permission to do so.
Making nonuseful derivative works is a behavior that lies within the scope of rights possessed
by the owner of a copyright. See King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 538 (2d
Cir. 1924) (finding that defendant infringed by making three-dimensional doll from plaintiff’s
two-dimensional cartoon horse).
The King Features opinion took pains to identify the purpose of the toy horse in words that
echoed the Baker opinion. The toy was described as serving the “production of amusement in
contemplation.” Id. at 537. In Baker, the Supreme Court approved as a copyright-appropriate
purpose “the production of pleasure in . . . contemplation.” Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104
(1880), quoted in King Features, 299 F. at 537.
169
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 105.
170
For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not even mention § 113(b) when
the question arose whether copyright in a drawing of a car can give the copyright owner rights
over how actual autos are designed. The answer should have been, “No.” Under § 113(b),
copyrighted portrayals of useful objects—such as drawings of the Batmobile—should give
166
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For copyright law to empower someone who has drawn a picture of an auto
to control manufacturers’ ability to use the design is problematic for several
reasons. Two are particularly worth mentioning: First, such an expansion of
copyright might raise the price of functional products and make it difficult for
innovators to improve on unpatented but copyrighted designs for useful articles.
Giving designers derivative-work rights over the manufacture of useful articles
could threaten patent law with a kind of legal kudzu.
Second, attractive designs often confer functional advantages: For example,
a sleek and aerodynamic design for a car body can save on gasoline. If so,
making auto manufacturers pay for copying an unpatented design confuses the
message conveyed by the royalties. The design might be popular because of its
ability to save gasoline, which is a consideration irrelevant to authorship.
Increasing artists’ royalties from “applied art” such as auto design might not
increase the kind of activities copyright seeks to foster.
Recall two principles from negligence law discussed above 171 and note the
parallel arguments in copyright law. The first principle mentioned was that
“[t]he harm that occurred must be one that results from the hazards that made
the defendant’s conduct tortious in the first place.”172 In copyright an author
should not be entitled to payment when the copying is done for a purpose
unrelated to the reasons authors were given copyright initially (e.g., as evidence
in litigation).173
The second principle is that “[a]n actor is not liable for harm when the tortious
aspect of the actor’s conduct was of a type that does not generally increase the
risk of that harm.”174 The copyright parallel is that a copyist should not be liable
when the conduct she engaged in was outside the range of uses whose potential
for profit usually induces creative expression. Liability for such copyists does
not generally increase the likelihood of reward to authors or encourage authors
to work harder.175

no derivative-work rights to control the manufacture or sale of working versions of the
depicted object. The decision, however, went the other way. See DC Comics v. Towle, 802
F.3d 1012, 1027 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding builder of replica Batmobiles liable for copyright
infringement).
171
See supra Section V.A.
172
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
173
Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note 33, at 406 (“Only in the area of ‘fit’ – authorial
works being used for authorial purposes – is the ability of copyright enforcement to produce
more benefits than costs likely to be more than coincidental.”).
174
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 30.
175
Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note 33, at 406 (suggesting that allowing
hypothetical composer to collect copyright infringement damages against people who use
copyrighted sheet music as decorative wallpaper “does nothing to reward composing skill or
encourage its further development”).
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Interoperability and the Scope of Computer Copyrights

For another example of how clearer notions of fit would slim down
copyright’s mass, consider computer interfaces. Interfaces promote software
compatibility and sometimes allow consumers and even whole industries to
avoid lock-in. An interface might have authorial characteristics that entitle its
creator to copyright,176 but when the interface is copied for purposes of
interoperability, the copier is indifferent to the authorial elements. As an
analogy, consider cutting a key to enable a guest to enter one’s house. When
ordering a key, the typical buyer won’t care whether the key’s notches, pins, and
grooves form a graceful shape or not. The key’s grace does not matter; all that
matters is that the notches, pins, and grooves fit the shape of the lock.177
Rewarding the designer of the key for each duplicate made would not
encourage good quality design; the frequency of copying is unrelated to any
aesthetic or expressive quality the Copyright Act would want to encourage. Such
copying is not done for reasons connected to the reasons Congress created the
copyright grant.178 Just as proximate cause doctrine rules out injuries unrelated
to the risks tort law seeks to affect, “fair use” and other copyright doctrines rule
out liability for copying for purposes unrelated to the incentives copyright means
to give to the initial author.
Some liberties to copy for interoperability are implicit and inherent in
Baker,179 and their mandate should be implemented. Baker stands in part for the
principle that rights under a particular species of law should be enforced only if
the facts presented have a logical connection to the kind of disputes that species
of law was crafted to resolve and the kinds of purposes that species of law was
crafted to serve.180 A century after Baker, though, Congress’s unfortunate
176

When Congress brought computer programs into copyright in 1980, the
recommendations upon which Congress relied depended on making a division between “the
copyrightable element of style and expression in a computer program” and the
uncopyrightable “process which underlies it.” NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 55 (1978), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext
/ED160122.pdf [https://perma.cc/S78M-9Y9V] (“It is difficult, either as a matter of legal
interpretation or technological determination, to draw the line between the copyrightable
element of style and expression in a computer program and the process which underlies it.”);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (prohibiting copyright in ideas, methods of operation,
processes, etc.); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57.
177
I employed essentially the same illustration in Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note
33, at 347. I borrow some other illustrations and arguments from that piece as well.
178
See supra Section V.B.2 (discussing congressional copyright policies and limitations).
179
Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note 33, at 394-95 (“[T]he Baker v. Selden opinion
contains language about the ‘necessity’ of using Selden’s forms – language that some have
interpreted as the Court assuming that few alternative accounting forms would do the job.”).
180
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1360-61, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding Java’s applied programming interface and its structure, sequence, and organization,
copyrightable as against claims of “merger” and “method of operation”). The lower court had
held the copied portions of Java uncopyrightable as “methods of operation.” Oracle Am., Inc.
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decision to put some computer programs into copyright has given rise to many
uncertainties.181 Copying method headers that are necessary to make one’s
program operate with another machine or program should be outside the scope
of a copyright owner’s control. Harnessing licensing fees for uses that are
indifferent to authorship, aesthetics, or communication will not increase the
likelihood of creative authorship occurring.182 Any relationship between the
physical acts of copying and the desired incentives is merely coincidental. As in
Brunswick and in Baker, when the connection between the acts complained of
and the law’s goals is purely fortuitous, no liability should result. 183
4.

Fair Use More Generally

Copyright law in the United States has always contained a doctrine
particularly sensitive to whether imposing liability in particular cases will serve
copyright’s purposes. This is the fair use doctrine.184
When a defendant receives fair use shelter because her work has a purpose far
different from that of the work of authorship she has copied, the difference in
purpose185 warns that giving the copied author a share of the defendant’s profits
might not provide reliable signals to authors about what kinds of creativity are
socially valuable.186 To return to a now-familiar example, sometimes when
documents are relevant to litigation, a party who authored the documents tries
to employ his or her copyright interest to prevent the documents from being
copied for court use. Courts have almost unanimously rejected such attempts.
This makes sense in terms of fit with the statutory purpose of incentivizing
v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 976-77 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
181
See Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note 33, at 421 (“Congress could be seen as
eliminating one barrier to enforcing copyright in computer programs but retaining another. It
eliminated the old visual-bound definition of ‘copy,’ but retained the public’s liberty to
employ copyrighted portrayals of useful articles to make and sell functioning versions of those
articles without authorization.”).
182
See id. at 427 (“[I]ncentives to create more or better expression can have only random
correlation with copying that is motivated by expressive-indifferent concerns.”).
183
Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 477 (1977) (holding
that plaintiff in antitrust action “must prove injury of the type that the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful”). I
am indebted to Professor Ariel Katz for this point and to Lemley & McKenna, supra note
103, for their examination of the issue.
184
Although the origin of fair use was in judicial opinions, today’s statute recognizes the
doctrine at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
185
Samuelson, supra note 8, at 2593-97, 2619; see also Leval, supra note 8, at 1111
(arguing that fair use justification turns on whether “challenged use is transformative,”
meaning that “use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different
manner or for a different purpose from the original”).
186
Gordon, How Oracle Erred, supra note 33, at 404 (“Lack of ‘fit’ in a particular instance
shows merely that enforcement will fail to further a particular law’s goals.”).
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creation: there is little likelihood that generating fees for courtroom use would
increase the amount of valuable authorship. It is unlikely that authors would
create more works for the purpose of collecting licensing fees for litigation.
Fair use is under attack in many quarters. The U.S. government has even
entered into international treaties that, in the eyes of some, have both restricted
other nations from following our fair use model and imperiled fair use on its own
ground in the United States.187 A better understanding of fair use would make
clear its legitimacy and might have given the government pause before agreeing
to such unfortunate treaty developments.
5.

Summarizing the Analogy: From “Proximate Cause” to “Proximate
Use”

These applications of fit can be restated in terms of “proximate cause.” We
begin with repeating a statement from the Third Restatement of Torts: “An actor
is not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct was of a
type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm.”188 Translating that
sentence into copyright’s terms: “An author is not entitled to remedy when the
nature of the defendant’s conduct was of a type which, if licensed, would not
generally increase the likelihood of desirable authorial works being created.”
The durational limits on copyright, the use/explanation distinction of Baker, the
§ 113(b) limitations on copyrights on design, and the doctrine of fair use are all
attempts to implement this principle.
CONCLUSION
The copyright statute lists a number of actions over which copyright owners
have dominion—notably, copying the work, adapting or preparing variations on
the work, publicly displaying the work, publicly performing the work, and
distributing the work.189 If a physical description of the defendant’s behavior
matches a physical behavior that appears on the list, then some courts will
resolve the prima facie scope-of-right issue in the plaintiff’s favor. Most courts,
though, are sensitive to context, as mandated by many of copyright’s doctrines,
including fair use.
Fair use arises when enforcing an exclusive right would fail to further
copyright’s goals. One form of fair use arises when benefiting from expressivity
187

The United States has acceded to both the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement, each of which uses a three-step test for copyright limitations. Many fear the threestep test will curtail fair use. See generally ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., THE THREE-STEP TEST,
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/three-step_test_fnl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6QH-B75J]
(last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
188
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 30
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (emphasis added).
189
17 U.S.C. § 106. After 1976, rights over other behaviors, such as defacing certain
original paintings, id. § 106A, or bypassing encryption, id. § 1201, have been grafted onto the
basic copyright statute.
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had no role in motivating the defendant’s decision to copy. That is, if the
defendant’s acts of copying, adaptation, public display, etc. were done for
purposes unrelated to the author’s communicative skills, a court should rule that
the defendant violated no duty and cannot be held liable. As Professor
Drassinower puts a similar point, “a re-producing of certain shapes of ink on a
page” is not necessarily “a reproduction of the work as a work.”190
It is not using a work “as a work of authorship” to copy it to serve as evidence
in litigation.191 The copying is fair use. Nor is it using a work “as a work of
authorship” to incorporate a sketch of highway designs into the shape of an
actual highway interchange.192 A defendant who copies to enable
interoperability between computer programs is similarly not using the work as a
work of authorship; to that defendant, the expressive value of the bits copied are
irrelevant. Liability should only attach to copying that, if controlled by the
author, would increase the quantity or quality of expressivity.
In holding Google liable, the Federal Circuit turned its back on decades of
federal cases that have held technological interoperability to be a sufficient
ground for fair use treatment. The cause of the Federal Circuit’s erroneous
decision to impose liability is hard to fathom.
One possible explanation might be a popular intuition that links responsibility
and credit to causation. Under such a view, anyone who causes a harm should
be forced to pay for it, and anyone who causes a benefit should be given
exclusive rights to profit from it. In tort, the view has sometimes been termed
“causal maximalism.”193 In IP, commentators sometimes employ the phrase
“anti-free-riding” to designate this view;194 another signifier is the agricultural
metaphor “do not reap where you have not sown.”195 Professor Rochelle Cooper
190

Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copyright
Vis-à-Vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 223; see also DRASSINOWER,
supra note 19, at 85-88 (discussing “work as a work” method of analyzing copyright).
191
See Samuelson, supra note 8, at 2593-97, 2619.
192
Unsurprisingly, courts refrain from imposing liability on attorneys who publicly
display duplicated copyrighted documents for evidentiary purposes or on municipalities who
employ copyrighted plans to guide their road constructions. See Samuelson, supra note 8,
2592-97 (discussing precedent).
193
H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW, at lxvii-lxviii (2d ed. 1985).
194
This is Professor David Franklyn’s locution, in his candid and articulate defense of the
principle. David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the
Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 117-18 (2004).
195
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239, 245-46 (1918) (enjoining one
news-gathering service from copying facts from similar news organization). The majority
opinion combined two sorts of reasoning: (a) that as a moral matter, viewed ex post, the copier
was trying to “reap where he had not sown” and (b) that as a consequentialist matter, taking
an ex ante view, the Court worried that refusing plaintiff any relief might fatally damage the
news business. See Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 125, at 178-80, 223-23, 26673; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (describing each approach to intellectual property).
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Dreyfuss identifies it with a logical leap that she calls “if value, then right.” 196
Sometimes the intuition is linked to John Locke’s labor theory of property. 197
Despite a century of criticism, the anti-free-riding intuition retains some
allure. Some of its surface shine comes from simple shortsightedness. Consider
the following breezy reasoning. “No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and
for which he would normally pay.”198
Ask any IP scholar to describe the big issues of the field in a thimble and she
will probably reply: “The tension between two desirable goals—incentives and
dissemination.” To say that “no social purpose” is served by refusing to grant
exclusive rights against copying—as was quoted above—largely wipes the
public’s interest in dissemination off the map. Just to mention the basics:
Exclusive rights against copying raise prices above marginal cost. Pricing above
marginal cost imposes deadweight loss and impedes dissemination. Often a mix
of limited exclusive rights with natural advantages (such as lead time and
customer loyalty) yields better social returns than sole reliance on exclusive
rights. And so on.
The anti-free-riding impulse has some defenders. Professor David Franklyn,
for example, has argued that courts will not go overboard in following the
impulse because judges are able to identify those defendants whose actions are
justified.199 Even if one concedes arguendo some force to the anti-free-riding
impulse, copying for purposes of interoperability must be fair use under
copyright law.

The majority opinion has not carried the day historically. Even at its birth, two Justices
objected to the majority’s approach, subjecting the ruling both to trenchant philosophic
critique (by Justices Holmes) and to objections based on administrability (by Justice
Brandeis). See supra note 4 (describing Brandeis’s approach).
196
Dreyfuss, supra note 38, at 405 (reviewing impact of “value/right” impulse in case
law). Justice Holmes was unconvinced by the majority in International News Service. In a
separate opinion, he wrote: “Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although
exchangeable—a matter of fact. Many exchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally
without compensation.” Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
197
See, e.g., Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 125, at 167-70, 208-10
(discussing Lockean labor theory).
198
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Harry
Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law–Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 331 (1966).
199
See generally Franklyn, supra note 194 (defending the anti-free-riding notion in the
context of one type of trademark dispute) However, I think it is a mistake to place a burden
on defendants to justify their free riding, at least when it is harmless. What the courts should
be doing is putting a burden on plaintiffs to show that, when they bring suit, their victory
would further the goals of the law that gave them IP rights in the first instance. So far, most
courts would refuse such an invitation and put at least a burden of going forward on the
proponents of fair use. To investigate those issue further would take us too far afield.
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Yes, it is undeniable that in developing the Android platform, Google copied
from Oracle’s Java a set of method headers. Yes, there is undoubtedly enough
creativity somewhere in the Java program to support Oracle’s claim of holding
a copyright in it. And yes, one can imagine the Federal Circuit judges asking
themselves: “If Oracle’s predecessor in interest did something socially valuable,
and Google benefits without paying when it uses a part of that valuable product,
why shouldn’t we reward Oracle and punish the free rider? Wouldn’t funneling
monetary incentives to entities that provide popular products, such as Java, and
leaching incentives away from free riders further goals of efficiency? Given the
coincidence that software uses words and numbers, copyright is an available tool
to do all of this. Why not use the tool at hand? Java has sowed the seeds and
only its owner Oracle should reap them.”
The answer is institutional. It is patent law—not copyright law—that should
evaluate the extent to which these seeds should be permitted to flower.
Copyright is simply not calibrated to handle technological issues such as
interoperability. As many judges and scholars have emphasized, copyright’s
very ease of acquisition and long duration can make copyright law a buzz-saw
when a scalpel is required.
Moreover, Congress and the courts have made clear that copyright must defer
to patent law, filling copyright with doctrines fashioned precisely to diminish
copyright’s potential for spilling into patent territory. Consider the useful-article
doctrine,200 the use/explanation distinction,201 the prohibition on copyright in
ideas and methods of operation,202 the doctrine of fair use,203 and the rule on
“merger”204—all these overlapping provisions keep copyright from awarding
exclusive rights that might conflict with patent’s dominance. Each of these rules
or doctrines refuses to impose liability for copying that more properly lies near
or within patent law’s sphere of concern. Imposing liability that ignores such a
basic component of federal IP law would impair not only interoperability but
also fair use and the interior logic of copyright law.

200
201
202
203
204

17 U.S.C. § 113 (2018).
See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1880).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
See id. § 107.
See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1359-62 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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